Includes bibliographical references (pages 179-188) and index.
CONTENTS NOTE
Text of Note
Introduction: Overview of the Problem and Its Solution; Sincerity and Strategy-Proofness: Which System Is Most Honest?; The Condorcet Criterion: Which System Best Finds the Majority Candidate?; The Reconstruction of an Election under Alternative Rules; Power and Equity: Which System Is Fairest?; Deducing Condorcet Candidates from Election Data; Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections; Recent Empirical Examples and Theoretical Extensions; Deducing Preferences and Choices in the 1980 Presidential Election; Epilogue.
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
"Approval Voting proposes a compelling way to elect some 500,000 officials in public elections. Under this system voters may vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. Among the many benefits of approval voting are its propensity to elect the majority candidate (rather than the strongest minority candidate, as often occurs under plurality voting), its relative invulnerability to insincere or strategic voting, and-by offering voters the opportunity to influence election outcomes more equitably-a probable increase in voter turnout."--Jacket.
ACQUISITION INFORMATION NOTE
Source for Acquisition/Subscription Address
Springer
Stock Number
978-0-387-49895-9
OTHER EDITION IN ANOTHER MEDIUM
Title
Approval voting.
International Standard Book Number
9780387498959
PIECE
Title
Springer e-books
TOPICAL NAME USED AS SUBJECT
Voting, Plural-- United States.
Voting, Plural.
POLITICAL SCIENCE-- Political Process-- Elections.