Part I, The problem. The origins of set theory ; Set theory as a foundation ; The standard axioms ; Independent questions ; New axiom candidates -- Part II, Realism. Gödelian realism ; Quinean realism ; Set theoretic realism ; A realist's case against ; Hints of trouble ; Indispensability and scientific practice ; Indispensability and mathematical practice -- Part III, Naturalism. Wittgensteinian anti-philosophy ; A second Gödelian theme ; Quinean naturalism ; Mathematical naturalism ; The problem revisited ; A naturalist's case against.
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
Set theory has rendered the notion of self-evident truths to be obsolete in mathematics. Penelope Maddy examines this dilemma using the minimum of technical jargon. Set theory is explained in a manner that can be understood by non-mathematicians.