Intro; Preface; Contents; Synopsis; 1 The Fundamentals of Non-cooperative Games; 1.1 Introduction to Game Theory; 1.2 Three Essential Elements in Non-cooperative Games; 1.3 Non-cooperation Game Model Form; 1.3.1 Representation of the Non-cooperative Game Matrix; 1.3.2 Representation of the Non-cooperative Game Extensive Form; 1.4 The Optimal Strategy (the Optimal Action) and the Worst Strategy (the Worst Action); 1.4.1 The Optimal Strategy (the Optimal Action); 1.4.2 The Worst Strategy (the Worst Action); 1.4.3 Relative Optimal Strategy.
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1.5 Nash Equilibrium and How to Find the Nash Equilibrium1.5.1 Nash Equilibrium; 1.5.2 Nash's Theorem and the Odd Number Theorem; 1.6 How to Find the Nash Equilibrium in Static Games; 1.6.1 How to Find Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium-Method of Underlining Relative Optimal Strategy; 1.6.2 Finding Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium-Extremum Method; 1.6.3 Finding Nash Equilibrium for Games with Continuous Strategies-Extremum Method; 1.7 Determining the Outcome of a Game with Multiple Nash Equilibria; 1.7.1 Risk Control Principle; 1.7.2 The Principle of Pareto Optimum.
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1.8 Nash Equilibrium in Dynamic Games2 Low Efficiency Caused by Non-cooperative Games; 2.1 Prisoner's Dilemma; 2.2 Competition and Cooperation for Duopoly-The Cournot Model and Cooperation Payoff; 2.3 The Irrational Equilibrium in the Tragedy of the Commons and Sun Shaorong's Fishing Model, and How the Number of People in a Collective Affects Efficiency; 2.3.1 An Introduction to the Tragedy of the Commons and Sun Shaorong's Fishing Model; 2.3.2 Sun Shaorong's Fishing Model; 2.3.3 Sun Shaorong's Non-rational Behaviour Equilibrium Point B_0^ *
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2.3.4 Collective Rationality Equilibrium Point B^**2.3.5 Comparisons of Non-rational Equilibrium Point B_0^ *, Individual Rationality Nash Equilibrium Point B^ *, and Collective Rationality Equilibrium Point B^**; 2.3.6 True Equilibrium Point-Depending on Society's Average Profit; 2.3.7 The Influence of the Quantity of Collective (n) on Equilibrium Point; 3 Free Ride, Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and Separating Equilibrium; 3.1 Free Ride Under Conditions of Symmetrical Information; 3.2 Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection; 3.2.1 Asymmetric Information.
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3.2.2 Adverse Selection3.2.3 Ways to Solve Adverse Selection; 3.3 Separating Equilibrium; 3.4 Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard; 3.5 Some Approaches for Solving Moral Hazard; 4 First-Move Advantage and Second-Move Advantage; 4.1 First-Move Advantage; 4.1.1 First-Move Advantage in Discrete Behaviour; 4.1.2 First-Move Advantage in Continuous Behaviour; 4.2 Second-Move Advantage; 4.3 Both First-Move Advantage and Second-Move Advantage May Be Present; 5 Credible Commitment and Credible Threat in Games; 5.1 Credibility of Commitments and Threats; 5.1.1 Commitment and Threat.
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
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This book primarily addresses various game theory phenomena in the context of management practice. As such, it helps readers identify the profound game theory principles behind these phenomena. At the same time, the game theory principles in the book can also provide a degree of guidance for solving practical problems. As one of the main areas in management research, there is already an extensive body of literature on game theory. However, it remains mainly theoretical, focusing on abstract arguments and purely numerical examples purely. This book addresses that gap, helping readers apply game theory in their actual management or research work.