عنوان
پدید آورنده
موضوع
رده
BC199.M6 S55 2019
BC199
.
M6
S55
2019
کتابخانه
محل استقرار
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
(Number (ISBN
0191871141
(Number (ISBN
0192568809
(Number (ISBN
9780191871146
(Number (ISBN
9780192568809
Erroneous ISBN
0199228647
Erroneous ISBN
9780199228645
TITLE AND STATEMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY
Title Proper
Necessity lost :
General Material Designation
[Book]
Other Title Information
modality and logic in early analytic philosophy.
First Statement of Responsibility
Sanford Shieh.
Volume Designation
Volume I /
EDITION STATEMENT
Edition Statement
First edition.
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Place of Publication, Distribution, etc.
Oxford, United Kingdom :
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
Oxford University Press,
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
[2019]
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
©2019
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
1 online resource
INTERNAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES/INDEXES NOTE
Text of Note
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
CONTENTS NOTE
Text of Note
Cover; Necessity Lost: Modality and Logic in Early Analytic Philosophy: Volume I; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Preface; Abbreviations; Introduction; Necessity Lost: Frege; Necessity Lost: Russell; Looking Ahead: Necessity Regained; Lewis; Wittgenstein; Closing Remarks; PART I: Frege; 1: The Modalities of Judgment; 1.1 Frege against Traditional Logic; 1.1.1 A Brief Sketch of Traditional Logic; 1.1.2 Kant on Judgment and Logic; 1.1.3 Problems of Traditional Logic; 1.1.4 The Fregean Solution; 1.2 Frege's Early Conception of Judgment; 1.3 Frege against Kant in Begriffsschrift
Text of Note
1.4 Modality in Frege's Begriffsschrift2: Amodalism; 2.1 Two Interpretations of Frege on Modality; 2.2 Truth is Absolute; 2.2.1 Against Hilbert and Korselt; 2.2.2 Thoughts are not Temporal or Spatial; 2.3 Amodalism; 2.4 Early Truth Absolutism and Amodalism; 2.5 Inadequate Grounds for Amodalism; 3: From Judgment to Amodalism; 3.1 Judgment and Truth after the Sense/Reference Distinction; 3.2 Redundancy against the Predication Analysis; 3.2.1 More Varieties of Redundancy; 3.2.2 Doubts about Redundancy; 3.2.3 Summary; 3.3 The Indefinability of Truth; 3.4 What is a Step to a Truth-Value?
Text of Note
3.5 The Recognitional Conception of Judgment3.5.1 The Supervenience of Truth-Predicating Judgments; 3.5.2 Judgment as Recognition; 3.5.3 Recognition as Step to the Level of Referents; 3.5.4 Thoughts (Gedanken) as Representations (Vorstellungen); 3.5.5 The Constitution of the Step to a Truth-Value; 3.5.6 The Recognitional Conception and Redundancy; 3.5.7 Nugatio ab Omnia Nævo Vindicatus; 3.5.8 Two Worries; Isn't the Recognitional Conception a Correspondence Theory of Truth?; Aren't Vorstellungen Psychological?; 3.5.9 The Recognitional Conception and Object-Relation Interpretations
Text of Note
3.5.10 Recognition and Acknowledgment3.6 Judgment, Judging, and Factivity; 3.6.1 Against the Factivity of Fregean Judgment; 3.6.2 For the Factivity of Fregean Judgment; 3.6.3 Judging vs. Judgment; Holding True vs. Acknowledgment of Truth; 3.6.4 The Independence of Truth from Acknowledgment of Truth; 3.6.5 A Letter to Jourdain; 3.7 Apparent Thoughts; 3.8 The Basic Argument for Truth Absolutism; 3.9 The Basic Argument before the Sense/Reference Distinction?; 3.10 A Concluding Remark; 4: The Truth in Modalism; 4.1 Parts of Thoughts
Text of Note
4.1.1 Between Begriffsschrift and the Sense/Reference Distinction4.1.2 After the Sense/Reference Distinction; 4.1.3 Multiple Analyses; 4.2 Fregean Accounts of Temporalism; 4.2.1 Senses expressed as a Function of Time; 4.2.2 Another Argument against Temporalism; Redundancy and Temporalism; Propositional Attitudes or Compound Thoughts?; 4.2.3 Senses presenting Times as Parts of Thoughts; 4.2.4 Temporal Modal Discourse; 4.3 Fregean Accounts of Circumstantialism; 4.3.1 A Parallel to Temporalism; 4.3.2 Circumstances as Thoughts, I; 4.3.3 Metaphysical Modal Discourse, I
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
Philosophers since Aristotle have traditionally held that impossibilities make up the nature of logic. Sanford Shieh investigates an important but underexplored break with this tradition: Frege and Russell questioned whether there really are such things as possibilities or necessities, and sought the foundations of logic elsewhere.
OTHER EDITION IN ANOTHER MEDIUM
International Standard Book Number
9780199228645
TOPICAL NAME USED AS SUBJECT
Analysis (Philosophy)
Logic.
Analysis (Philosophy)
Logic.
PHILOSOPHY-- Logic.
(SUBJECT CATEGORY (Provisional
PHI-- 011000
DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION
Number
160
Edition
23
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CLASSIFICATION
Class number
BC199
.
M6
Book number
S55
2019
PERSONAL NAME - PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY
Shieh, Sanford,1962-
ORIGINATING SOURCE
Date of Transaction
20200822092759.0
Cataloguing Rules (Descriptive Conventions))
pn
ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Electronic name
مطالعه متن کتاب [Book]
Y
