Disagreement, deference, and religious commitment /
General Material Designation
[Book]
First Statement of Responsibility
John Pittard.
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Place of Publication, Distribution, etc.
New York, NY :
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
Oxford University Press,
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
[2019]
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
1 online resource
GENERAL NOTES
Text of Note
Also issued in print: 2019.
INTERNAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES/INDEXES NOTE
Text of Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
CONTENTS NOTE
Text of Note
Disagreement-motivated religious skepticism and the commitment to impartiality -- De-motivating reasons impartiality -- From impartiality to instrumentalism -- Partisan justification and religious belief -- Affective rationalism and religious insight -- Elusive impartiality -- Unpalatable conclusions and deliberative vertigo.
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
The striking extent of religious disagreement suggests that religious conviction is very often the result of processes that do not reliably produce true beliefs. For this reason, many have argued that the only rational response to religious disagreement is to adopt a religious skepticism that eschews confident religious belief. This text contests this conclusion, explaining how it could be rational to maintain confident religious (or irreligious) belief even in the face of persistent disagreement.