Intro; Table of Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; Abstract; 1 Introduction; 2 Literature; 3 Market Experiment; 3.1 Experimental Design; 3.2 Individual Estimation; 3.3 Endowment; 3.4 Information Levels; 3.5 Treatments; 3.5.1 Call Auction Mechanism; 3.5.2 Continuous Double Auction Mechanism; 3.6 Payoff; 3.7 Questionnaire; 4 Results; 4.1 Estimations of Glass Value; 4.2 Estimations in Call Auction Markets and Continuous Double Auction Markets; 4.3 Market Mechanisms; 4.4 Trading Volume and Net Change of Assets; 4.5 Critique and Ideas for Future Research; 5 Conclusion; 6 Appendix.
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
Larissa Katharina Senninger analyses the phenomenon of wisdom of the crowd in experimental capital markets. Aiming to find out which market mechanism is able to aggregate different information in a meaningful way, a continuous double auction and a call auction mechanism are tested. In line with expectations, markets with continuous double auction mechanism are better able to aggregate information and additionally take a shorter time. The author shows that receiving more information enables subjects to make better estimations, whereas more information improves the quality of estimations significantly only if it is a lot more information. The author Larissa Katharina Senninger holds a master's degree from the Leopold-Franzens-University in Innsbruck. She started her professional career in the risk controlling department of a German finance service in Munich and is currently responsible for interest rate risk and liquidity risk.--