عنوان

The regulation of systemically relevant banks :

(Number (ISBN

3658238100

(Number (ISBN

3658238119

(Number (ISBN

9783658238100

(Number (ISBN

9783658238117

Erroneous ISBN

3658238100

Erroneous ISBN

9783658238100

Title Proper

The regulation of systemically relevant banks :

General Material Designation

[Book]

Other Title Information

how governments should manage their exposure to banking system risk /

First Statement of Responsibility

Sebastian C. Moenninghoff ; with a foreword by Hon.-Prof Dr. Axel Wieandt.

Place of Publication, Distribution, etc.

Wiesbaden, Germany :

Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.

SpringerGabler,

Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.

[2018]

Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item

1 online resource (xvi, 170 pages)

Series Title

Finance, banks and bank management

Text of Note

3.4.1.1 Zero exposure: Narrow banking with all-equity financed banks

Text of Note

Includes bibliographical references.

Text of Note

Intro; Foreword; Preface; Table of Contents; List of Abbreviations; List of Figures; List of Tables; 1. Introduction; 2. Consequences of Government Guarantees for Banks -- A Survey of the TBTF Doctrine; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Surveys of Government Guarantees for Banks; 2.3 TBTF as a Consequence of Government Guarantees; 2.3.1 Consequences of government guarantees; 2.3.2 The logic of the TBTF doctrine; 2.3.3 Alternative theories in the context of government guarantees for banks; 2.3.4 Empirical approaches to measuring the prevalence of TBTF; 2.4 Government Exposure and Subsidies

Text of Note

2.4.1 Contingent claims approach and absolute subsidy estimates2.4.2 Funding advantages based on contingent claims approach and rating-implied spreads; 2.4.3 Costs of past rescue measures; 2.4.4 Summary of empirical evidence of government exposure and subsidies; 2.5 Competitive Distortions from Government Guarantees; 2.5.1 Dimensions of competitive distortions; 2.5.2 Empirical approaches to measure guarantee-return relationships; 2.5.3 Empirical evidence of competitive distortions; 2.5.3.1 Competitive distortions by individual institution systemic relevance

Text of Note

2.5.3.2 Competitive distortions by scope of activities covered by guarantees2.5.3.3 Competitive distortions by geography; 2.5.4 Summary of empirical evidence of competitive distortions; 2.6 Government Guarantees and Risk Taking; 2.6.1 The concept of moral hazard in banking; 2.6.2 Empirical approaches based on guarantee-risk relationships; 2.6.3 Empirical findings based on guarantee-risk relationships; 2.6.4 Summary of empirical evidence of bank risk taking based on guarantee-risk relationships; 2.6.5 Empirical approaches based on risk-return relationships

Text of Note

2.6.6 Empirical findings based on risk-return relationships2.6.7 Summary of empirical evidence of bank risk taking based on risk-return relationships; 2.7 Conclusion; 3. Government Guarantees and Banking System Risk -- A Regulatory Framework from an Exposure Perspective; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Banking System Exposure from a Credit Risk Perspective; 3.2.1 Fundamentals of an exposure perspective for banking system risk; 3.2.2 Structural credit risk modeling in regulatory capital determination; 3.2.3 Application of structural credit risk models to government guarantees for banks

Text of Note

3.2.4 Credit risk components of banking system exposure3.2.4.1 Probability of distress; 3.2.4.2 Exposure at distress; 3.2.4.3 Loss given distress; 3.2.5 An exposure-based framework of principle policy choices; 3.3 Banking System Exposure from a Sovereign Portfolio Perspective; 3.3.1 Introduction to sovereign portfolio management; 3.3.2 Macroeconomic tradeoffs implied by regulatory policy choices; 3.3.3 Banking system exposure management from a portfolio perspective; 3.4 Regulatory Policy Options and Their Economic Tradeoffs; 3.4.1 Management of probability of distress

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Text of Note

Sebastian Moenninghoff provides an extensive overview of the status of the 'Too-Big-to-Fail' doctrine post-crisis and develops the first comprehensive framework to categorize and discuss the full range of major policy options for regulating banks. Governments need to actively manage their exposure to banking system risk with the optimal policy mix depending on risk return preferences of a society and an economy's institutional setting. The new regulation for global systemically important banks developed by international regulators following the financial crisis is a significant step in expanding the tools to manage government exposure to banking system risk. Contents Comprehensive Review of the Post-Crisis Status of the 'Too-Big-to-Fail' Doctrine Novel Quantitative Framework to Categorize and Discuss the Full Range of Major Policy Options for Bank Regulation Empirical Examination of the New International Regulation Dealing with Global Systemically Important Banks Target Groups Researchers and students in the fields of economics with a focus on finance and banking Practitioners in the fields of financial services, banking, regulation, politics, and journalism The Author Sebastian Moenninghoff works in the financial services industry in New York. He has extensive experience advising financial institutions in the U.S. and Europe during and after the financial crisis and has published and taught on banking regulation and financial innovation.--

Source for Acquisition/Subscription Address

01663989

Stock Number

978-3-658-23810-0

Title

Regulation of Systemically Relevant Banks : How Governments Should Manage Their Exposure to Banking System Risk.

International Standard Book Number

9783658238100

Asset-liability management.

Bank management.

Financial risk management.

Asset-liability management.

Bank management.

Financial risk management.

Number

Edition

Class number

Book number

Moenninghoff, Sebastian C.

Wieandt, Axel,1966-

Date of Transaction

20200823181729.0

Cataloguing Rules (Descriptive Conventions))

pn

Electronic name

[Book]

Y