Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part I: The Phenomenological Project: Definition and Scope -- Part II: The Unfolding of Phenomenological Philosophy -- Part III: At the Limits of Phenomenology: Towards Phenomenology as Philosophy of Limits -- Contents -- Part I: The Phenomenological Project: Definition and Scope -- An Analytic Phenomenology: Husserl's Path to the Things Themselves -- 1 Introduction -- 2 In the Depth of Subjectivity: A Return to the I and the Others -- 2.1 Formal Logic Versus Pure Logic -- 2.2 Communication Between Reasonable Beings
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2.3 Does "I" Mean Something? I as Indexical -- 3 The Antepredicative Articulation of Linguistic Thoughts -- 3.1 The Antepredicative Part of the Language -- 3.2 The Passive Synthesis and the Animation of Words -- 4 The Expression of Reduced Experience: The Transcendental Sprache -- 4.1 The Reduction and the Problem of the Mundane Language -- 4.2 The Egological Content of the Expression -- 5 Conclusion: An Overture to the Ichrede -- References -- Parts, Wholes, and Phenomenological Necessity -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Problem of Necessity and Pure Logic -- 3 Parts, Wholes, and Necessary Fitness
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3 Problem and Solution -- 4 Further Discussion -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Philosophy as an Exercise in Exaggeration: The Role of Circularity in Husserl's Criticism of Logical Psychologism -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Tautology of Inner Evidence: Psychologistic Cynicism as a Testimony to the Ideality of Logical Laws -- 3 Circularity of Ideal Laws -- The Irony of Purification as a Testimony to the Self-Assurance of Inner Evidence -- 4 Husserl's challenge to the Self-Assurance of Reason -- 5 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Primary Texts -- Primary Texts in Translation -- Secondary Sources
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4 Multi-level Generalizations -- 5 The Distinction Between Analytic and Synthetic Necessity -- 6 Correlational A priori and Intentionality -- 7 The A priori Bound to the Empirical and the Problem of Necessity -- References -- The Early Husserl Between Structuralism and Transcendental Philosophy -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Transcendental Philosophy and Structuralism -- 3 Phenomenology as Wissenschaftslehre -- 4 Wholes and Aggregates -- 5 Transcendental Structuralism -- References -- Transcendental Consciousness: Subject, Object, or Neither? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Three Readings
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Part II: The Unfolding of Phenomenological Philosophy -- Husserl's Idea of Rigorous Science and Its Relevance for the Human and Social Sciences -- 1 The Idea of Rigorous Science in Husserl and its Relevance for the Human and Social Sciences -- 2 Alfred Schutz and the Phenomenology of Social Life -- 3 Final Remarks -- References -- Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant's Original Insight and Husserl's Reappraisal -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Ego-Splitting as Unexplainable Fact in Kant -- 3 Husserl's Phenomenology of Ego-Splitting -- 3.1 Ego-Splitting in Representifications
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
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Bringing together established researchers and emerging scholars alike to discuss new readings of Husserl and to reignite the much needed discussion of what phenomenology actually is and can possibly be about, this volume sets out to critically re-evaluate (and challenge) the predominant interpretations of Husserls philosophy, and to adapt phenomenology to the specific philosophical challenges and context of the 21st century. "What is phenomenology?", Maurice Merleau-Ponty asks at the beginning of his Phenomenology of Perception - and he continues: "It may seem strange that this question still has to be asked half a century after the first works of Husserl. It is, however, far from being resolved." Even today, more than half a century after Merleau-Pontys magnum opus, the answer is in many ways still up for grasp. While it may seem obvious that the main subject of phenomenological inquiry is, in fact, the subject, it is anything but self evident what this precisely implies: Considering the immense variety of different themes and methodological self-revisions found in Husserls philosophy - from its Brentanian beginnings to its transcendental re-interpretation and, last but not least, to its 'crypto-deconstruction in the revisions of his early manuscripts and in his later work -, one cannot but acknowledge the fact that 'the subject of phenomenology marks an irreducible plurality of possible subjects. Paying tribute to this irreducible plurality the volume sets out to develop interpretative takes on the phenomenological tradition which transcend both its naive celebration and its brute rejection, to re-articulate the positions of other philosophers within the framework of Husserls thought, and to engage in an investigative dialogue between traditionally opposed camps within phenomenology and beyond.