1. Introduction: Preparing to `'Be" Phenomenological: Heidegger's "Preliminary" Question ; Destructively Retrieving Husserl ; Destructively Retrieving Dilthey ; Retrieving Dilthey for Our Sake -- 2. From Dilthey to Heidegger: Recasting the Erklären-Verstehen Debate: Two Kinds of Science? What Is at Stake ; Dilthey's Experience-Based Defense of Verstehen ; Dilthey on the Standpoint of Life ; Husserl's Phenomenological Replacement of Dilthey's Standpoint -- 3. Heidegger's Destructive Retrieval of Dilthey's "Standpoint of Life": On Phenomenology: Dilthey before Husserl ; Appropriating Diltheyan "Intuitions" ; Appropriating What Is Formally Indicated ; Where and How Appropriation Ends -- 4. From Dilthey to Husserl: "Genuine" Phenomenology ; "Ambiguity" in Husserl's Writings ; Husserl's "Theoretical" Defense of Phenomenology ; Husserl's Opposition to Naturalism and Historicism ; Phenomenology's Special Version of Philosophy's "Problem of Method" -- 5. Heidegger's Diltheyian Retrieval of Husserl's Two Side: The "Rigor" of Genuine Phenomenology ; Turn toward Rigor or Return to Life ; Bracketing versus "Rejoining" Lifeworld Experience ; Natorp's "Subjectification" of Erlebnis ; Reading Natorp through Dilthey ; From Dilthey to Achieving Phenomenology's "Basic Attitude" ; Sustaining Phenomenology's Basic Attitude -- 6. Conclusion: Continuously "Becoming" Phenomenological: Giving Dilthey His Due ; Becoming Phenomenological, Never Being Phenomenological ; Phenomenology, Not Just Phenomenological Scholarship
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
In this first book-length study of the topic, Robert C. Scharff offers a detailed analysis of the young Heidegger's interpretation of Dilthey's hermeneutics of historical life and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. He argues that it is Heidegger's prior reading of Dilthey that grounds his critical appropriation of Husserl's phenomenology. He shows that in Heidegger's early lecture courses, a "possible" phenomenology is presented as a genuine alternative with the modern philosophies of consciousness to which Husserl's "actual" phenomenology is still too closely tied. All of these philosophies tend to overestimate the degree to which we can achieve intellectual independence from our surroundings and inheritance. In response, Heidegger explains why becoming phenomenological is always a possibility; but being a phenomenologist is not. Scharff concludes that this discussion of the young Heidegger, Husserl, and Dilthey leads to the question of our own current need for a phenomenological philosophy--that is, for a philosophy that avoids technique-happiness, that at least sometimes thinks with a self-awareness that takes no theoretical distance from life, and that speaks in a language that is "not yet" selectively representational.
OTHER EDITION IN ANOTHER MEDIUM
Title
Heidegger becoming phenomenological.
International Standard Book Number
9781786607744
PERSONAL NAME USED AS SUBJECT
Dilthey, Wilhelm,1833-1911.
Heidegger, Martin,1889-1976.
Husserl, Edmund,1859-1938.
Dilthey, Wilhelm, 1833-1911
Dilthey, Wilhelm,1833-1911.
Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976
Heidegger, Martin,1889-1976.
Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938
Husserl, Edmund,1859-1938.
TOPICAL NAME USED AS SUBJECT
Phenomenology.
08.25 contemporary western philosophy (20th and 21th century)