the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War /
First Statement of Responsibility
Melvyn P. Leffler.
EDITION STATEMENT
Edition Statement
1st ed.
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Place of Publication, Distribution, etc.
New York :
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
Hill and Wang,
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
2007.
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
1 online resource (xx, 586 pages) :
Other Physical Details
illustrations, maps
INTERNAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES/INDEXES NOTE
Text of Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 545-570) and index.
CONTENTS NOTE
Text of Note
The origins of the Cold War, 1945-48 : Stalin and Truman -- The chance for peace, 1953-54 : Malenkov and Eisenhower -- Retreat from Armageddon, 1962-65 : Khrushchev, Kennedy, and Johnson -- The erosion of détente, 1975-80 : Brezhnev and Carter -- The end of the Cold War, 1985-90 : Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush.
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
To the amazement of the public, pundits, and even the policymakers themselves, the ideological and political conflict that had endangered the world for half a century came to an end in 1990. How did that happen' What caused the cold war in the first place, and why did it last as long as it did' The distinguished historian Melvyn P. Leffler homes in on four crucial episodes when American and Soviet leaders considered modulating, avoiding, or ending hostilities and asks why they failed: Stalin and Truman devising new policies after 1945; Malenkov and Eisenhower exploring the chance for peace after Stalin's death in 1953; Kennedy, Khrushchev, and LBJ trying to reduce tensions after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; and Brezhnev and Carter aiming to sustain dEtente after the Helsinki Conference of 1975. All these leaders glimpsed possibilities for peace, yet they allowed ideologies, political pressures, the expectations of allies and clients, the dynamics of the international system, and their own fearful memories to trap them in a cycle of hostility that seemed to have no end. Leffler's important book illuminates how Reagan, Bush, and, above all, Gorbachev finally extricated themselves from the policies and mind-sets that had imprisoned their predecessors, and were able to reconfigure Soviet-American relations after decades of confrontation.
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS NOTE (ELECTRONIC RESOURCES)
Text of Note
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.