Cover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; List of figures; List of tables; Notes on contributors; Acknowledgements; Introduction; 1 Background; 2 Content; Part I Fundamental theories; 1 Regulatory reform after the financial crisis: Twin Peaks revisited; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 (Why) does institutional structure matter?; 1.3 The case for Twin Peaks; 1.4 The Twin Peaks structure; 1.5 Four lessons from the financial crisis; 1.6 Conclusion; 2 Financial stability and proper business conduct: can supervisory structure help to achieve these objectives?; 2.1 Introduction.
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2.2 Supervisory objectives and structure2.3 Conduct of business: a focused approach; 2.4 Financial stability: strong role for central bank; 2.5 Emerging Twin Peaks structure in Europe; 2.6 Conclusion; 3 Rules, discretion and macro-prudential policy; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Rules-based macro-prudential regulation is difficult; 3.3 Discretion opens the door to resistance; 3.4 A strong baseline: reducing the burden on time-varying policy; 3.5 Conclusion; 4 Helping hand or grabbing hand? Supervisory architecture, financial structure and market view; 4.1 Introduction.
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4.2 Do markets matter in designing financial supervision architectures? Helping hand view versus grabbing hand view4.3 Does the market factor matter?; 4.4 Case study: the market view in Italy; 4.5 Conclusion; Part II International experiences; 5 Implementing Twin Peaks: lessons from Australia; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Background to Australia's Twin Peaks model; 5.3 Managing the transition; 5.4 Harmonizing the approach to regulation; 5.5 Defining the regulatory boundaries; 5.6 Inter-agency coordination; 5.7 Conclusion; 6 The break-up of the Financial Services Authority in the UK; 6.1 Introduction.
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6.2 Did the FSA have to go? An examination of the case for abolition6.3 Why it matters that the case for abolition of the FSA cannot be convincingly established; 6.4 Summary; 7 One step forward, two steps back? The institutional structure of US financial services regulation after the crisis of 2008; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 A product of history: an overview of the US financial regulatory structure before 2010; 7.3 What is to be done? Themes in the debate on reforming the US financial regulatory structure; 7.4 The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010: key changes in the US financial regulatory structure.
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7.5 What to expect? Uncertain prospects and certain challenges7.6 Conclusion; 8 Evolving supervisory and regulatory approaches of Japan in the post-crisis era; 8.1 Introduction; 8.2 The genesis of the institutional structure of financial supervision; 8.3 Evolving supervisory approaches; 8.4 Conclusion; 9 Financial regulatory structure in Hong Kong: looking forward; 9.1 Introduction; 9.2 Historical financial development; 9.3 Regulatory structural themes; 9.4 Financial regulatory structure; 9.5 Global Financial Crisis: Hong Kong; 9.6 International organizations.
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
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In light of on-going global financial crises, the institutional structure of financial regulation is currently a subject of significant academic and practical interest. The financial crisis has called into question the adequacy of financial regulation at the national and supranational levels, and has instigated financial regulatory reforms in major markets overseas. This has included the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in the US, and the programme to split the Financial Services Authority in the UK. This book examines the institutional structure reform of financial regulation from a c.