an analysis of the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
University of Glasgow
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
1991
DISSERTATION (THESIS) NOTE
Dissertation or thesis details and type of degree
Thesis (Ph.D.)
Text preceding or following the note
1991
SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
In one sense, the Palestinian problem dates back to early history when the Canaanites, Israelites and Philistines contended for the territory and its resources. However, the modern Palestine problem dates only from the Balfour Declaration in 1917, and yet has proved to be more deadly, with six wars if one includes the Gulf War, and more intractable, with attempts to create a state of Palestine for nearly three-quarters of a century. A recent attempt to solve the problem was the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979. If that had been the only purpose of Presidents Carter and Sadat and Prime Minister Begin at Camp David and of the last two in signing the Treaty in Washington, their efforts could only be described as futile. But more was at stake: the ending of a state of war and the resolution of outstanding territorial claims. In that regard the `Camp David process' was successful - indeed successful to the extent that an issue not resolved during the process, the question of Taba, was amicably settled by Egypt and Israel through arbitration. This thesis seeks to analyse the `Camp David process' and the terms of the Treaty in an attempt to answer the question of how the state of war, equally important for Egypt and Israel, could be satisfactorily ended for both parties, how the territorial claims, equally important for both Israel and Egypt, could be resolved, when the issue of Palestine, the source of virtually all the present conflicts in the Middle East and essential for the Egyptians as part of the Arab nation, should remain unresolved, despite the provisions of the Camp David Accords and the Treaty.