عنوان
پدید آورنده
موضوع
رده
کتابخانه
محل استقرار
NATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY NUMBER
Number
TL48191
LANGUAGE OF THE ITEM
.Language of Text, Soundtrack etc
انگلیسی
TITLE AND STATEMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY
Title Proper
Construction bidding and the winner's curse
General Material Designation
[Thesis]
First Statement of Responsibility
Muaz O. Ahmed
Subsequent Statement of Responsibility
Truax, Dennis D.; El-adaway, Islam H.
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
Mississippi State University
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
2015
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
152
GENERAL NOTES
Text of Note
Committee members: Coatney, Kalyn T.; Martin, James L.; White, Thomas D.
NOTES PERTAINING TO PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Text of Note
Place of publication: United States, Ann Arbor; ISBN=978-1-321-69751-3
DISSERTATION (THESIS) NOTE
Dissertation or thesis details and type of degree
M.S.
Discipline of degree
Civil and Environmental Engineering
Body granting the degree
Mississippi State University
Text preceding or following the note
2015
SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
In the construction industry, the winner's curse occurs when the winning contractor has underestimated the project's true cost. Using a game and auction theory approach, this study aims to analyze - and potentially reduce - industry exposure to the effects of the winner's curse in construction bidding. A simulation model for single and multi-stage bidding processes was developed and analyzed an actual dataset of California Department of Transportation projects. The majority of general contractors and sub-contractors suffer from the winner's curse in both single and multi-stage bidding environments. The multi-stage bidding environment incurs more losses than the single-stage bidding environment. Through learning from past experiences though, the multi-stage bidding environment provides contractors with better opportunity to avoid the winner's curse. Finally, it was shown that the symmetric risk neutral Nash equilibrium optimal bid function provides the contractors with a tool to avoid the winner's curse and gain strategic positive profits.
TOPICAL NAME USED AS SUBJECT
Management; Civil engineering
UNCONTROLLED SUBJECT TERMS
Subject Term
Social sciences;Applied sciences;Auction theory;Construction bidding;Game theory;Winner's curse
PERSONAL NAME - PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY
Terndrup, Alison P.
PERSONAL NAME - SECONDARY RESPONSIBILITY
Truax, Dennis D.; El-adaway, Islam H.
CORPORATE BODY NAME - SECONDARY RESPONSIBILITY
Subdivision
Civil and Environmental Engineering
Mississippi State University
LOCATION AND CALL NUMBER
Call Number
1679462480; 1586941
ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Electronic name
مطالعه متن کتاب p
[Thesis]
276903
a
Y
