Contemporary Philosophical Approaches to Understanding Scientific Practice
First Statement of Responsibility
edited by Nancy J. Nersessian.
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Place of Publication, Distribution, etc.
Dordrecht
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
Springer Netherlands
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
1987
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
(XIII, 221 pages)
SERIES
Series Title
Science and philosophy, 3.
CONTENTS NOTE
Text of Note
Method in the philosophy of science and epistemology: How to inquire about inquiry and knowledge --; 'Twixt method and madness --; Historical realism and contextual objectivity: A developing perspective in the philosophy of science --; Research problems and the understanding of science --; Twenty years after --; The semantic approach to scientific theories --; The garden in the machine: Gender relations, the processes of science, and feminist epistemological strategies --; The cognitive study of science --; A cognitive --; historical approach to meaning in scientific theories --; Naturalizing observation --; Realist methodology in genetics --; Parsimony and the units of selection.
SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
For some time now the philosophy of science has been undergoing a major transfor mation. It began when the 'received view' of scientific knowledge -that developed by logical positivists and their intellectual descendants - was challenged as bearing little resemblance to and having little relevance for the understanding of real science. Subsequently, an overwhelming amount of criticism has been added. One would be hard-pressed to find anyone who would support the 'received view' today. Yet, in the search for a new analysis of scientific knowledge, this view continues to exert influence over the tenor of much of present-day philosophy of science; in particular, over its problems and its methods of analysis. There has, however, emerged an area within the discipline - called by some the 'new philosophy of science' - that has been engaged in transforming the problems and methods of philosophy of science. While there is far from a consensus of beliefs in this area, most of the following contentions would be affirmed by those working in it: - that science is an open-ended, on-going activity, whose character has changed significantly during its history - that science is not a monolithic enterprise - that good science can lead to false theories - that science has its roots in everyday circumstances, needs, methods, concepts, etc.