Moral Theory and Moral Judgments in Medical Ethics
General Material Designation
[Book]
First Statement of Responsibility
edited by Baruch A. Brody.
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Place of Publication, Distribution, etc.
Dordrecht
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
Springer Netherlands
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
1988
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
(VI, 232 pages).
SERIES
Series Title
Philosophy and medicine, 32.
CONTENTS NOTE
Text of Note
Moral Theory and Moral Judgments in Biomedical Ethics --; Section I / Deriving Utilitarian Consequences --; Utilitarian Goals and Kantian Constraints (or: Always True to You, Darling, in my Fashion) --; Utilitarians Among the Optimists --; Utilitarianism and the Informed Consent Requirement (or: Should Utilitarians be Allowed on Medical Research Ethical Review Boards?) --; Reply to Ruddick and Reiman --; Section II / Natural Right Casuistry --; Moral Rights and Causal Casuistry --; Death by Omission --; Coffee and Casuistry: It Doesn't Matter Who Caused What --; Section III / Marx's Theory: Deriving Moral Implications --; Marxism and Moral Judgment --; Marx, Moral Judgment, and Medical Ethics: Commentary on Buchanan --; Section IV / Christian Casuistry --; Reconciling the Practice of Reason: Casuistry in a Christian Context --; Christianity in a Social Context: Practical Reasoning and Forgiveness --; Section V / From Theory to Praxis --; The Relation of Moral Theory to Moral Judgments: A Kantian View --; Justification in Ethics --; Theory and Practice in Ethics --; Notes on Contributors.
SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
Principles. A second solution to this problem is to develop a scale for weighing the significance of the conflicting principles in a given case and for concluding which action should be adopted because it is supported by the weightier considerations in that case. Such a solution seems more realistic than the lexical ordering approach, but the development of such a scale is a problematic task. Still other, more complex solutions are possible. Which is the best solution to this problem of conflicting principles of bioethics? We need a moral theory to answer that question. This is the first reason for concluding that the principles of bioethics are not the true foundations of justified judgment in bioethics. What is the problem of the unclear scope and implications of the principles of bioethics and how can an appeal to moral theory help deal with that problem? The scope of a bioethical principle is the range of cases in which it applies. The implications of a bioethical principle are the conclusions to be derived from that principle in those cases in which it applies. It is clear from a review of the discussions in bioethics that there are major unclarities about the scope and implications of each of the principles. Consider, for example, the principle of autonomy.