Adjustment Processes for Exchange Economies and Noncooperative Games
General Material Designation
[Book]
First Statement of Responsibility
by Antoon Elzen.
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Place of Publication, Distribution, etc.
Berlin, Heidelberg
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
1993
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
(vii, 146 pages)
SERIES
Series Title
Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems, 402.
CONTENTS NOTE
Text of Note
1. Introduction --; 1.1 Adjustment processes in economies --; 1.2 Some examples of globally efficient processes --; 1.3 Outline of the monograph and main results --; 2. Preliminaries --; 2.1 Notation --; 2.2 The stationary point problem --; 2.3 Notions related to simplicial algorithms --; 2.4 Concepts from differential topology --; 3. Existence of adjustment processes --; 3.1 Two price adjustment processes for a pure exchange economy --; 3.2 The proportional process 37 3.3. Direct approach towards the sign process 4l 3.4. Homotopy approach towards the sign process --; 4. An adjustment process for an international trade model --; 4.1 The model --; 4.2 An example --; 4.3 The process --; 4.4 Description of the price adjustments --; 4.5 Numerical illustration --; 5. An adjustment process for an exchange economy with linear production technologies --; 5.1 The model --; 5.2 Existence of the path 82 5.3. The adjustment process 86 5.4. Examples --; 6. Finding Nash equilibria in noncooperative games --; 6.1 Solving the bi-matrix game as a stationary point problem --; 6.2 The procedure --; 6.3 Game-theoretic interpretation --; 6.4 How to find more equilibria --; 6.5 Interpretation and generalization of the Lemke-Howson algorithm --; 6.6 Computing Nash equilibria in noncooperative more-person games --; References.
SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
The first part of this book deals with tatonnement processes in different general equilibrium models. The standard price exchange model, an international trade model and an economy with production are considered. Theadvantage of these processes, in contrast to the standard Walras process, is that their convergence is guaranteed under weak conditions. The second part of the book deals with game theory. More special, with the computation of Nash equilibria in noncooperative games. It is shown how to find a perfect equilibrium and illustrated that the described method is superior to the Lemke-Howson method and can be used for finding more equilibria.