Includes bibliographical references (pages 269-293) and index
CONTENTS NOTE
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Problem and Theory: The politics of when. Theorizing intertemporal policy choice -- Programmatic Origins: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Design: Investing in the state: the origins of German pensions, 1889. The politics of mistrust: the origins of British pensions, 1925. Investments as political constraint: the origins of U.S. pensions, 1935. Investing for the short term: the origins of Canadian pensions, 1965 -- Programmatic Change: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Reform. Investment as last resort: reforming U.S. pensions, 1977 and 1983. Shifting the long-run burden: reforming British pensions, 1986. Committing to investment: reforming Canadian pensions, 1998. Constrained by uncertainty: reforming German pensions, 1989 and 2001 -- Conclusion: Understanding the politics of the long term
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
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"In Governing for the Long Term, Alan M. Jacobs investigates the conditions under which elected governments invest in long-term social benefits at short-term social cost. Jacobs contends that, along the path to adoption, investment-oriented policies must surmount three distinct hurdles to future-oriented state action: a problem of electoral risk, rooted in the scarcity of voter attention; a problem of prediction, deriving from the complexity of long-term policy effects; and a problem of institutional capacity, arising from interest groups' preferences for distributive gains over intertemporal bargains. Testing this argument through a four-country historical analysis of pension policymaking, the book illuminates crucial differences between the causal logics of distributive and intertemporal politics and makes a case for bringing trade-offs over time to the center of the study of policymaking"--
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"This book examines how democratic governments manage long-term policy challenges, asking how elected politicians choose between providing policy benefits in the present and investing in the future"--