metaphysical foundations of the disunity of science /
First Statement of Responsibility
John Dupré.
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Place of Publication, Distribution, etc.
Cambridge, Mass. :
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
Harvard University Press,
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
1993.
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
viii, 308 p. ;
Dimensions
24 cm.
INTERNAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES/INDEXES NOTE
Text of Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 291-302) and index.
CONTENTS NOTE
Text of Note
I. Natural Kinds and Essentialism. 1. Natural Kinds. 2. Species. 3. Essences -- II. Reductionism. 4. Reductionism and Materialism. 5. Reductionism in Biology 1: Ecology. 6. Reductionism in Biology 2: Genetics. 7. Reductionism and the Mental -- III. The Limits of Causality. 8. Determinism. 9. Probabilistic Causality -- IV. Some Consequences of Disorder. 10. The Disunity of Science. 11. Science and Values. Notes. Bibliography. Sources.
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
The great dream of philosophers and scientists for millennia has been to give us a complete account of the order of things. A powerful articulation of such a dream in this century has been found in the idea of a unity of science. With this manifesto, John Dupre systematically attacks the ideal of scientific unity by showing how its underlying assumptions are at odds with the central conclusions of science itself. In its stead, the author gives us a metaphysics much more in keeping with what science tells us about the world.
Text of Note
The order presupposed by scientific unity is expressed in the classical philosophical doctrines of essentialism, materialist reductionism, and determinism. Employing examples from biology, that most "disordered" of sciences, Dupre subjects each of these doctrines to detailed and devastating criticism. He also identifies the shortcomings of contemporary approaches to scientific disunity, such as constructivism and extreme empiricism. He argues that we should adopt a "moderate realism" consistent with pluralistic science. Dupre's proposal for a "promiscuous realism" acknowledges the existence of a fundamentally disordered world, in which different projects or perspectives may reveal distinct, somewhat isolated, but nevertheless perfectly real domains of partial order.
Text of Note
This argument makes connections with recent discussions of science and value, especially in the work of feminist scholars. In Dupre's view, we have a great deal of choice about which scientific projects to pursue, a choice that can be informed only by value judgments. Such choices determine not only what kinds of order we observe in nature but also what kinds of order we impose on the world we observe. Elegantly written and compellingly argued, this provocative book should be of crucial interest to all philosophers and scholars of science.