campaign finance law, political interest groups, and the problem of equality /
First Statement of Responsibility
Thomas Gais.
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Place of Publication, Distribution, etc.
Ann Arbor :
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
University of Michigan Press,
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
c1996
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
xvi, 236 p. :
Other Physical Details
ill. ;
Dimensions
24 cm.
INTERNAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES/INDEXES NOTE
Text of Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 219-227) and index.
CONTENTS NOTE
Text of Note
1. Introduction -- 2. Collective Action, Institutions, and Bias in the PAC System -- 3. The Size and Scope of the PAC System -- 4. PAC Formation among Interest Groups: Incentives and Their Limits -- 5. PAC Formation among Interest Groups: Institutional Constraints -- 6. PACs, Groups, and Public Policies -- 7. PACs, Groups, and the Political Parties -- 8. Conclusions -- App. A. Merged Data on Associations and PACs: Sources, Procedures, and Descriptions -- App. B. Coding PACs according to Occupational Type: Data Sources and Coding Rules -- App. C. Explanation of the Interactive Model of PAC Affiliation.
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
. Gais makes a significant contribution to the literature on interest groups, election and campaign finance reform, and the role of money in politics. This volume will interest specialists in American politics, collective action, the role of business in politics and public choice as well as policymakers involved in campaign finance reform.
Text of Note
The author concludes that our campaign finance laws reflect a fundamental discrepancy between our ideals about the role of small individual contributors and the real ways in which broadly based groups actually get organized. Deregulating group activity, the author suggests, may be the only way to promote pluralism and reduce the dominance of the campaign finance system by economic institutions.
Text of Note
This book argues that the campaign finance laws prevent many citizen groups from forming effective political action committees (PACs) - organizations created by interest groups to raise and spend money in elections - while the regulations are less of an obstacle to business groups in forming PACs. This results, the author asserts, in a campaign finance system which is biased in favor of economic interests. The author argues that the laws regulating PACs ignore the real difficulties of political mobilization - problems that political scientists have expounded in both theoretical and empirical analyses of collective action.
Text of Note
Why is there still so much dissatisfaction with the role of special interest groups in financing American election campaigns, even though no aspect of interest group politics has been so thoroughly regulated and constrained?
OTHER EDITION IN ANOTHER MEDIUM
Title
Improper influence.
Title
Improper influence.
TOPICAL NAME USED AS SUBJECT
Campaign funds-- Law and legislation-- United States.