عنوان

Belief about the self :a defense of the property theory of content

Title Proper

Belief about the self :a defense of the property theory of content

Place of Publication, Distribution, etc.

Oxford ; New York

Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.

Oxford University Press

Text of Note

Includes bibliographical references )p. 187-191( and index

Text of Note

Neil Feit

Text of Note

Mental content and the problem of De Se belief -- Cognitive attitudes and content -- The doctrine of propositions -- The problem of De Se belief -- The property theory of content -- In favor of the property theory -- Perry's messy shopper and the argument from explanation -- Lewis's case of the two Gods -- Arguments from internalism and physicalism -- An inference to the best explanation -- Alternatives to the property theory -- The triadic view of belief -- How the property theory and the triadic view are rivals -- Dyadic propositionalism reconsidered -- Arguments against the property theory -- Self-ascription and self-awareness -- Nonexistence and impossible contents -- Stalnaker's argument -- Propositionalist arguments from inference -- The property theory and De Re belief -- Lewis's account of De Re belief -- McKay's objection to Lewis -- Mistaken identity and the case of the shy secret admirer -- Some other worries and concluding remarks -- The property theory, rationality, and Kripke's puzzle about belief -- Kripke's puzzle about belief -- The puzzle argument -- A solution to the puzzle -- Puzzles with empty names and kind terms -- The property theory, twin earth, and belief about kinds -- Twin earth and two kinds of internalism -- The twin earth argument -- An internalist response )stage one( -- An internalist response )stage two( -- Self-ascription and belief about kinds

Entry Element

، Self )Philosophy(

Class number

Entry Element

Feit, Neil.

Relator Code

AU

TI