Guns, butter and debt: Sovereign credit and foreign policy
General Material Designation
[Thesis]
Subsequent Statement of Responsibility
;supervisor: Fordham, Benjamin
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
State University of New York at Binghamton: United States -- New York
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
: 2012
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
242 Pages
DISSERTATION (THESIS) NOTE
Dissertation or thesis details and type of degree
Ph.D.
SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
Scholars of world politics have neglected the fact that creditworthy states have, for centuries, relied on credit markets to finance wars and military spending. Where scholars have addressed variation in sovereign creditworthiness, they have explored only the material advantage of credit in the context of world power rivalries. This dissertation reintroduces the influence of creditworthiness on foreign policy outcomes by focusing on credit's material contribution and also its influence on the domestic politics of foreign policy. I argue that credit allows politicians to relax budget constraints and avoid the political consequences of alternative methods of finance (taxes, monetary expansion and spending cuts). As such, leaders can over come the "guns versus butter" dilemma and minimize both the material and political constraints that scholars often assume constrain the allocation of resources toward foreign policy. From here, I explore how sovereign creditworthiness and its absence influence more specific foreign policy outcomes and empirically test several subsequent implications. The empirical analyses indicate that creditworthiness has a positive effect on military spending and the mean probability and variance of conflict initiation. Furthermore, the absence of creditworthiness leads states to reduce interaction with rivals and increases the probability that they form alliances. This dissertation has implications for many areas of world politics. Overall, it provides a more nuanced understanding how economic costs influence foreign policy outcomes. In doing so, the dissertation also questions the applicability of the commonly assumed "guns versus butter" constraint. It suggests that the states with access to affordable credit can avoid many of implications of fixed-budget constraints and thus questions the many models of world politics that rest on this assumption. The dissertation also increases understanding of the impact that economic globalization exerts on international processes and foreign policy. While many international economic transactions are thought to pacify interstate relations, the findings here suggest that credit may enable more aggressive foreign policy and increased military spending.