Heritage sites, religious relics, family heirlooms, and natural entities are all highly valued. But what sorts of value do they have? Arguably, they do not have intrinsic value, or a value borne solely by their internal features. A family heirloom, for instance, has value because of its relation to a loved one. On a standard view, any object that lacks intrinsic value cannot be valuable for its own sake. Yet I argue against this. The foregoing can be valuable for their own sakes even if they do not have value intrinsically. They can have "extrinsic final value." My dissertation responds to a pressing objection to this idea by providing an account that shows precisely how entities can have this sort of value. To do so, I refine a particular methodology in Value Theory, according to which one can show that an object is valuable for its own sake by showing that there is a reason to value it in that way. I first explain what I mean when I talk about there being a "reason" to value entities. Then I provide an account of what it is to value something for its own sake. Using the above-mentioned methodology, I then sketch how there can be a reason to value an heirloom for its own sake on account of its relation to a loved one. Adapting my account, I show why there are reasons to value natural entities for their own sakes and illustrate various practical upshots of this view.