Shabaab survived the more than a decade old counterterrorism campaign because of the resilient organizational capabilities that have made it a better alternative to the public than its rivals and enemies. On the other hand, the counterterrorism campaign failed to defeat Shabaab because it lacked an in-depth and contextually relevant understanding of the Shabaab problem and the capacity to match the changes and evolutions of the group. Defeating Shabaab violence in Somalia requires coordinating efforts on depriving its vast territorial controls and clan covers and on building capable and inclusive local administrations by mobilizing the relevant local societal actors. It also needs reconfiguring and reorienting the counterterrorism campaign to suit the operational theater and coordinating the efforts of the various stakeholders of the campaign around denying the group's territorial and societal bases and building local administrations so that to rival Shabaab's dominance in the daily lives of the public.