British intelligence on Japanese strategy and military capabilities during the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, July 1937 to August 1945
London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)
2002
Ph.D.
London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)
2002
The evolution of British assessments regarding the threat posed by japan'sstrategy and military capabilities during the Pacific War is a subject that has beenneglected. Using archival material that has been previously unused, this thesiswill examine the manner in which intelligence influenced the British militaryestablishment's perception of its Japanese adversary. Moreover, it will attempt todetermine the effect that intelligence had on British war plans in the Far Easterntheaters. Using the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict in July 1937 as thestarting point, the thesis will illustrate the extent to which Britain'smiscalculation of its adversary prior to Japan's declaration of war on the West inDecember 1941 was due to the absence of reliable intelligence. In addition tothe obstacles created by the secretive manner in which Japan conducted itsdiplomacy and strategic planning, Britain's lack of first-hand experience indealing with its adversary prevented its military establishment from grasping thedangers that could be posed by japan's expansionist moves. The shock createdby Japan's spectacular victories in Southeast Asia following the outbreak of warin December 1941 was necessary to convince Britain that Japan was in fact bothwilling and capable of challenging the West. Furthermore, Britain's reversesbrought home the extent to which its forces in the Far East were inadequate. Asthe conflict progressed, the British military establishment used the intelligenceobtained through its encounters with Japan's armed forces in order to obtain anaccurate picture the threat that its enemy could pose, as well as to determine themost effective means by which the challenges could be overcome. The thesiswill therefore attempt to shed new light on Britain's conduct of its war againstJapan by illustrating the extent to which first-hand combat experience wasnecessary in order to enable the military establishment to accurately assess itsenemy, and to devise an effective strategy by which to defeat it.
History
Ford, Douglas Eric.
London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)