In the Name of Pluralism, although Not Quite Religious
Agnés Callamard
Leiden
Brill
The 25 years' jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the intersection between expression and religion reveals that three main ideas of religion have coexisted alongside each other, for many decades predating the current era. The jurisprudence also shows that the Court somehow accommodated (and justified) these different ideas through a focus on democratic pluralism (not religious pluralism), a conception of pluralism which makes religion (including in its diverse expressions) subservient to democratic principles. The 25 years' jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the intersection between expression and religion reveals that three main ideas of religion have coexisted alongside each other, for many decades predating the current era. The jurisprudence also shows that the Court somehow accommodated (and justified) these different ideas through a focus on democratic pluralism (not religious pluralism), a conception of pluralism which makes religion (including in its diverse expressions) subservient to democratic principles.