This article responds to J. Aaron Simmons' concerns that James K.A. Smith's methodology for confessional pentecostal philosophy prohibits philosophical dialogue with the confessional Other. Its responses specifically address Simmons' proposed personal methodology and his two main concerns about Smith's methodology: (1) confessional philosophy allows an encroachment of theology into philosophy that threatens the autonomy of philosophy; and (2) confessional philosophy discourages philosophical dialogue with the confessional Other, and promotes insularity and defensiveness by utilizing theologically determinate evidence that act as incommensurable authority structures. The first section of this paper exposits Simmons' other works that illumine the reasons for his concern. Specifically, it identifies Simmons' Thomistic view of reason and new phenomenology's commitment to the hypothetical status of God-talk as the reasons for Simmons' opposition to Smith's confessional philosophical method. After clarifying Simmons' own position, the second section addresses Simmons' concerns that confessional philosophy promotes epistemic arrogance, defensiveness, and dialogical insularity. Moreover, it provides five responses to Simmons' concern that confessional philosophy utilizes incommensurate authority structures and that it threatens philosophy's autonomy through the incursion of theology. The paper concludes with a reflection on the current state and future of pentecostal philosophy This article responds to J. Aaron Simmons' concerns that James K.A. Smith's methodology for confessional pentecostal philosophy prohibits philosophical dialogue with the confessional Other. Its responses specifically address Simmons' proposed personal methodology and his two main concerns about Smith's methodology: (1) confessional philosophy allows an encroachment of theology into philosophy that threatens the autonomy of philosophy; and (2) confessional philosophy discourages philosophical dialogue with the confessional Other, and promotes insularity and defensiveness by utilizing theologically determinate evidence that act as incommensurable authority structures. The first section of this paper exposits Simmons' other works that illumine the reasons for his concern. Specifically, it identifies Simmons' Thomistic view of reason and new phenomenology's commitment to the hypothetical status of God-talk as the reasons for Simmons' opposition to Smith's confessional philosophical method. After clarifying Simmons' own position, the second section addresses Simmons' concerns that confessional philosophy promotes epistemic arrogance, defensiveness, and dialogical insularity. Moreover, it provides five responses to Simmons' concern that confessional philosophy utilizes incommensurate authority structures and that it threatens philosophy's autonomy through the incursion of theology. The paper concludes with a reflection on the current state and future of pentecostal philosophy