Reformed Thought on Freedom introduces philosophical apparatus that was routinely employed by Reformed Orthodox theologians for discussing the metaphysics of human action. This article first offers critical reflection on the claims made for this apparatus as providing evidence for a commitment to the freedom of indifference. Then, taking the book's treatment of Francis Turretin's anthropology as an example, it is argued that the claim that his view of human freedom relies on the notion of synchronic contingency is not made out. There is a failure to distinguish between indifference as an intrinsic feature of the will, and the freedom of indifference. Reformed Thought on Freedom introduces philosophical apparatus that was routinely employed by Reformed Orthodox theologians for discussing the metaphysics of human action. This article first offers critical reflection on the claims made for this apparatus as providing evidence for a commitment to the freedom of indifference. Then, taking the book's treatment of Francis Turretin's anthropology as an example, it is argued that the claim that his view of human freedom relies on the notion of synchronic contingency is not made out. There is a failure to distinguish between indifference as an intrinsic feature of the will, and the freedom of indifference.