Inducing Nuclear Reversal: Foreign Policy Effectiveness and Deproliferation
[Thesis]
Petrovics, Ariel Alexia
Kinne, Brandon
University of California, Davis
2019
212 p.
Ph.D.
University of California, Davis
2019
The international community has worked for decades to combat the spread of nuclear weapons, but new proliferators continue to emerge despite these efforts. While scientific research has helped explained when and why states seek the bomb, scientists and policymakers still disagree over how to reverse that pursuit once it has already begun. This project therefore asks: what foreign policies most effectively induce nuclear reversal in proliferating states, and under what conditions will those policies be most effective? I present a theory of policy effectiveness that considers both the explicit punishment or rewards associated with any foreign policy, and the implicit security signals of these policies to the proliferator. I then develop a testable definition of policy effectiveness and test the implications of the theory through a mixed methods research design, using a mix of quantitative methods on cross-national panel data (1945-2012), and within-case comparisons of Iran and North Korea. This analysis finds that cooperative inducements are more effective than coercive strategies, leading to nuclear reversal more often and with a lower risk of perversely inciting greater proliferation instead. The effectiveness of these policies is mediated by the power and rivalry of the sending states, however. Cooperation from nuclear-armed rivals is more effective at inducing reversal than similar policies from non-nuclear allies, but coercive policies from these same nuclear-armed rivals also carry the greatest risks of perverse proliferation. The results provide insight into current nuclear reversal dilemmas, as well as implications for research and statescraft in foreign policy more generally.