عنوان
پدید آورنده
موضوع
رده
کتابخانه
محل استقرار
TL50448
انگلیسی
Sanctions-Busting and the Signing of New Preferential Trade Agreements and Bilateral Investment Treaties
[Thesis]
Su, Yi-hao
Early, Bryan R.
State University of New York at Albany
2019
155 p.
Ph.D.
State University of New York at Albany
2019
Why does the imposition of sanctions sometimes encourage the signing of new preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between target states and their trade partners? I develop the theory that "trade plants the flag" and the argument of "chomping at the BIT" to explain how the trade-based and foreign direct investment (FDI)-based sanctions-busting behavior of firms drives their home governments to sign new PTAs and BITs with target states. The notion that "trade plants the flag" reveals that sanctions-busting firms exercise political influence on governments to reinforce their competitiveness in sanctioned states by concluding the PTA negotiation. Likewise, the mechanism of "chomping at the BIT" illustrates the lobbying efforts of multinational corporations (MNCs) on their home governments to sign a BIT to protect their investment from expropriation by target states. This dissertation adopts a mixed-method approach to test these arguments. I find that sanctions-busting makes target states 1.25 times more likely to sign PTAs and 1.90 times more likely to sign BITs. Chapter 2 analyzes the signing of PTAs during sanctions using rare event (RE) logistic models associated with matching methods. Myanmar's admission to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Free Trade Area and Armenia's pursuit of a PTA with Iran demonstrate how the trade-based sanctions-busting behavior of firms plants the PTA flag. Chapter 3 assesses how "chomping at the BIT" works by employing RE models and conditional fixed-effect models on an original dataset derived from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development database. Lastly, Chapter 4 explains why some MNCs are keen to engage in FDI-based sanctions-busting behavior. The defense pact between their home governments and sender states reduces the likelihood of MNCs being punished for breaching the sanction law. The case of Taiwanese FDI to China after the United States sanction in 1989 shows how firms utilize their home governments' alliance with sender states. The findings of this study contribute to the scholarship on sanctions, PTAs, and BITs. First, this pioneering study investigates the institutionalized cooperation that emerges as an unintended consequence of sanctions. Thus, conflictual behavior in one dyad can generate cooperative behavior in another. Second, this study finds evidence that the formation of PTAs and BITs during sanctions is contingent upon firms' adjustment to the market distortion and turbulence by sanctions. The institutionalized cooperation, therefore, generates stable economic relations that help target states survive sanctions in the long run.
International relations
Political science
Su, Yi-hao
Early, Bryan R.
State University of New York at Albany
مطالعه متن کتاب p
[Thesis]
276903
a
Y
