Includes bibliographical references (pages 287-291) and index.
Part 1. Practical reason and Aristotle. A statement of the problem -- Aristotle and Hume: a preliminary contrast -- Reason and general ends -- The pervasiveness of Aristotle's views on practical reason -- The apparent support for the Humean position -- A summary of the argument -- The interest of Aristotle's position on practical reason: happiness and the good relative to human beings -- Does Aristotle's position on practical reason provide an adequate basis for ethics? -- Part 2. Aristotle and weakness of the will. The traditional interpretation: some problems and preliminaries -- An argument for the traditional interpretation -- An argument for an alternative interpretation.
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Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will was first published in 1984. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. One of the central problems in recent moral philosophy is the apparent tension between the ""practical"" or ""action-guiding"" side of moral judgments and their objectivity. That tension would not exist if practical reason existed (if reason played a substantial role in producing motivation) and if recognition of obligation.