new essays on belief, rationality, and the first person /
[edited by] Mitchell Green and John N. Williams.
New York :
Oxford University Press,
2007.
1 online resource (x, 247 pages) :
illustrations
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Introduction and historical context -- Introduction / Mitchell Green and John N. Williams -- The all-seeing eye : a blind spot in the history of ideas / Roy Sorensen -- Moore's paradox and knowledge -- Moorean absurdity : an epistemological analysis / Claudio de Almeida -- The normative character of belief / Thomas Baldwin -- Moore's paradox, Evans's principle, and iterated beliefs / John N. Williams -- Moore's paradox, belief, and assertion -- What reflexive pronouns tell us about belief : a new Moore's paradox de se, rationality, and privileged access / Jay David Atlas -- Moore's paradox and the transparency of belief / Jonathan E. Adler and Bradley Armour-Garb -- Moore's paradox and consciousness -- Consciousness, reasons, and Moore's paradox / André Gallois -- Moorean absurdity and showing what's within / Mitchell Green -- Arguments from Moore's paradox -- My philosophical position says and I don't believe / Alan Hájek -- Moorean pretense / Robert M. Gordon.
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G.E. Moore observed that to assert, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' would be 'absurd'. Over half a century later, such sayings continue to perplex philosophers. In the definitive treatment of the famous paradox, Green and Williams explain its history and relevance and present new essays by leading thinkers in the area. - ;G. E. Moore famously observed that to assert, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' would be 'absurd'. Moore calls it a 'paradox' that this absurdity persists despite the fact that what I say about myself mi.