why the United States did not use nuclear weapons in the Cold War, 1945 to 1965 /
Timothy J. Botti.
Westport, Conn. :
Greenwood Press,
1996.
1 online resource (xi, 311 pages).
Contributions in military studies,
no. 165
0883-6884 ;
Includes bibliographical references (pages 289-299) and index.
1. Sayonara Sanity? -- 2. War Scare -- 3. The Soviets Draw an Ace -- 4. Strategic Error -- 5. First Forbearance -- 6. The Cart Before the Horse -- 7. French Chestnuts in the Fire -- 8. The President Vacillates -- 9. Muscling Up -- 10. Sword of Damocles -- 11. The Last Sideshow -- 12. The Autobahn to Armageddon -- 13. Cocked Gun -- 14. Amateur Hour -- 15. Harebrained Schemes -- 16. Muddling Through -- 17. Multilateral Folly -- 18. High Noon -- 19. Two Bluffs -- 20. Best-Laid Plans -- 21. Strategic Incompetence -- 22. Unplayable Card?
0
Using newly released documents, the author presents an integrated look at American nuclear policy and diplomacy in crises from the Berlin blockade to Vietnam. The book answers the question why, when the atomic bomb had been used with such devastating effect against the Japanese Empire in 1945, American leaders put this most apocalyptic of weapons back on the shelf, never to be used again in anger. It documents the myopia of Potomac strategists in involving the U.S. in wars of attrition in Korea and Southeast Asia, marginal areas where American vital interests were in no way endangered. Despite.
Greenwood eBooks
Ace in the hole.
0313299765
Cold War.
Deterrence (Strategy)
Nuclear weapons-- Government policy-- United States-- History.