The reckoning of post-Chicago antitrust / Herbert Hovenkamp -- The difficult reception of economic analysis in European competition law / Roger Van den Bergh -- A preface to post-Chicago antitrust / Jonathan B. Baker -- Post-Chicago, post-Seattle and the dilemma of globalization / Eleanor M. Fox -- The bounds approach to antitrust / Patrick Van Cayseele -- Dynamic efficiency and U.S. antitrust policy / Rudolph J.R. Peritz -- Obvious consumer harm in antitrust policy: the Chicago school, the post-Chicago school and the courts / John E. Lopatka, William H. Page -- Second order oligopoly problems with international dimensions: sequential mergers, maverick firms and buyer power / Michael S. Jacobs -- Rule fixing: an overlooked but general category of collusion / Robert H. Lande, Howard P. Marvel -- Raising consumers' costs as an antitrust problem: a sketch of the argument from Kodak to Microsoft (the European proceedings) / Francesco Denozza -- How safe is the king's throne: network externalities on trial / Roberto Pardolesi, Andrea Renda -- The vertical price fixing controversy / Antonio Cucinotta -- The competitive dynamics of distribution restraints: efficiency versus rent seeking / Peter C. Carstensen -- Cooperation, competition and collusion among firms at successive stages / Robert L. Steiner.
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This work offers a critical evaluation of the Chicago approach to antitrust. Judgements by the United States Supreme Court (in cases such as Kodak) and the debate surrounding the Microsoft monopoly have led to the view that antitrust has entered the post-Chicago era, in which previous immoderations are tempered, and more refined and accurate analyses take precedence. This claim is made at a time when European competition policy is gradually embracing an economics-based approach. The authors discuss the economic foundations of competition policy and the different ways in which both American and.