Acknowledgments; 1 Thinking about Thought; Brentano's Problem; Naturalism, Consciousness, and Intentionality; From Informational Content to Representational Content; Original versus Derived Intentionality; Representations, Targets, and Contents; Semantic Evaluations; Teleosemantics; Overview of What Is to Come; 2 Positing Nonconceptual Representations; A First Example; A Second Example: AH's Visual Deficit; The Inference to Normal Perceivers; Representational (as Opposed to Informational) Content; Intensional Ascriptions; The Formality Assumption.
Sharpening the Methodological ConundrumSemantic Externalism; Concluding Remarks; 3 Functional Analysis and the Species Design; How-Questions and Why-Questions; A Division of Explanatory Labor for SE and CR Functions?; Minimal and Normal-Proper Functions; Questioning Thesis 3; Solving the Generalization Problem; The Properly Functioning System; Is It Idealization?; Related Views; Concluding Remarks; 4 The Methodological Argument for Informational Teleosemantics; The Bare-Bones Version; Premise 1; Premises 2 and 3; Premises 4 and 5; Premise 6; From Methodology to Metaphysics.
Teleosemantics: The Only Game in Town?Fodor's (Teleosemantic) Asymmetric-Dependency Theory; Cummins' (Teleosemantic) Picture Theory; Concluding Remarks; 5 Simple Minds; Why Anuran Perception Is Not a Toy Example; Sign-Stimuli and Prey-Capture in a Toad; Information Flow in the Neural Substrate; The Localization Content; What Is Represented?; An Attenuated Form of Verificationism?; Concluding Remarks; 6 Response Functions; Starting Teleosemantics at the Right End; Functions as Selected Dispositions; How Blind Is Natural Selection?; Normal Conditions versus Normal Causes.
Traditional Objections to Similarity-Based ContentWho Specifies the Isomorphism?; The Pictorial Intuition and Color Realism (Again); The Missing Shade of Blue; Representing Determinates of Determinables; Berkeley's Problem of Abstraction; A Neo-Lockean Strategy; A Neo-Humean Proposal; Concluding Remarks; 9 Distal and Distant Red Squares; The Problem of Distal Content; Informational Asymmetries in Response Functions; Other Solutions; Perceptual Constancies and Distal Content; Hallucinated Red Squares: In the World or Just in the Head?; Binding to Spatiotemporal Representation.
Unsuitable Analyses of InformationA Simple Causal Analysis of Information; Information-Carrying Functions; Concluding Remarks; 7 The Content-Determinacy Challenges; Six Content-Determinacy Challenges; The Simple Starter Theory: CT; Distinguishing Locally Co-Instantiated Properties; Distinguishing Properties Mutually Implicated in Selection; A Note on Color Realism; Seeing Green versus Seeing Grue; Mach Diamonds versus Ordinary Squares; Concluding Remarks; 8 Causally Driven Analogs; Inner Worlds Mirroring Outer Worlds; Analog Representations; The Second-Order Similarity Rule.
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Drawing on insights from causal theories of reference, teleosemantics, and state space semantics, a theory of naturalized mental representation.
JSTOR
MIT Press
MIT Press
22573/ctt1qqcgqg
7387
9780262339865
A Mark of the Mental : In Defense of Informational Teleosemantics.