Cover; Necessary Existence; Copyright; Acknowledgments; Contents; 1: Introduction; 1.1 The Question of Necessary Existence; 1.2 Why Necessary Existence Matters; 1.3 The â#x80;#x9C;Necessary Beingâ#x80;#x9D; Survey Results; 2: Metaphysical Possibility and Necessity; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 What is Metaphysical Modality?; 2.3 Modal Logic; 2.3.1 Overview; 2.3.2 Uncontroversial Aspects; 2.3.3 S4 Axiom; 2.3.3.1 Violations; 2.3.3.2 unconditionality and invariance; 2.3.3.3 two accounts of modality; 2.3.3.4 weakness and strength; 2.3.4 Brouwer and S5 Axioms; 2.3.4.1 mutual recognition; 2.3.4.2 invariance
2.3.4.3 worlds2.3.4.4 we cannot make necessities happen; 2.3.5 Objection to S4 and S5: No Transitivity of Transworld Identity; 2.3.6 Objection to Brouwer and S4: Existentialism; 2.4 The S5 Ontological Argument and Two-dimensional Semantics; 2.4.1 The Basic Ontological Argument; 2.4.2 Two-dimensional Semantics; 2.4.3 A Parody; 3: An Argument from Contingency; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The Argument from Contingency; 3.3 On Behalf of the Premises; 3.4 Objections; 3.4.1 Objection 1 (Hume); 3.4.2 Objection 2 (Hume); 3.4.3 Objection 3 (Hume Again); 3.4.4 Objection 4 (More Hume)
3.4.5 Objection 5 (Hume Once More)3.4.6 Objection 6 (Kant); 3.4.7 Objection 7 (Kant); 3.4.8 Objection 8 (Graham Oppy, William Rowe, Peter van Inwagen); 3.4.9 Objection 9 (Oppy and Leon); 3.4.10 Objection 10; 3.5 Concluding Assessment; 4: An Argument from Possible Causes; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 The Modal Argument from Beginnings; 4.3 On Behalf of the Premises; 4.4 Objections; 4.4.1 Objection 1; 4.4.2 Objection 2; 4.4.3 Objection 3; 4.4.4 Objection 4; 4.4.5 Objection 5; 4.5 Concluding Assessment; 5: From Possible Causes II; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Restricted Causal Principles
5.3 The Restricted Modal Argument5.4 On Behalf of the Premises; 5.5 Objections; 5.5.1 Objection 1; 5.5.2 Objection 2; 5.5.3 Objection 3; 5.5.4 Objection 4; 5.5.5 Objection 5; 5.6 Concluding Assessment; 6: From Modal Uniformity; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Uniformity as a Guide to Possibility; 6.3 Restricted Modal Uniformity; 6.4 Applications to Arguments from Contingency; 6.4.1 The Argument from Contingent Existence; 6.4.2 The Modal Argument from Beginnings; 6.4.3 TheWeak Argument from Beginnings; 6.5 Objection; 6.6 Concluding Assessment; 7: From Necessary Abstracta to Necessary Concreta
7.1 Introduction7.2 The Main Argument; 7.3 Necessarily There Are Abstracta; 7.3.1 Truthbearers; 7.3.2 Properties; 7.3.3 Mathematical Entities; 7.3.4 Against Abstracta; 7.4 If There Are Abstracta, There Are Concreta; 7.5 Itâ#x80;#x99;s Possible for There to Be No Contingent Concrete Entities; 7.6 Weakening the Possibility of No Concreta; 7.7 Concluding Assessment; 8: The Argument from Perfections; 8.1 History and Introduction; 8.2 The Main Argument; 8.3 Positivity and the Formal Axioms; 8.3.1 Schema or Quantification Over Second-order Properties; 8.3.2 A Positive is Not Negative
0
8
8
8
8
Necessary Existence' breaks ground on one of the deepest questions anyone ever asks: why is there anything? The classic answer is in terms of a necessary foundation. Yet, why think that is the correct answer? Pruss and Rasmussen present an original defense of the hypothesis that there is a concrete necessary being capable of providing a foundation for the existence of things. They offer six main arguments, divided into six chapters. The first argument is an up-to-date presentation and assessment of a traditional causal-based argument from contingency. The next five arguments are new "possibility-based" arguments that make use of twentieth-century advances in modal logic. The arguments present possible pathways to an intriguing and far-reaching conclusion. The final chapter answers the most challenging objections to the existence of necessary things.