Disagreement, deference, and religious commitment /
[Book]
John Pittard.
New York, NY :
Oxford University Press,
[2019]
1 online resource
Also issued in print: 2019.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Disagreement-motivated religious skepticism and the commitment to impartiality -- De-motivating reasons impartiality -- From impartiality to instrumentalism -- Partisan justification and religious belief -- Affective rationalism and religious insight -- Elusive impartiality -- Unpalatable conclusions and deliberative vertigo.
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The striking extent of religious disagreement suggests that religious conviction is very often the result of processes that do not reliably produce true beliefs. For this reason, many have argued that the only rational response to religious disagreement is to adopt a religious skepticism that eschews confident religious belief. This text contests this conclusion, explaining how it could be rational to maintain confident religious (or irreligious) belief even in the face of persistent disagreement.