Sovereign debt crises and negotiations in Brazil and Mexico, 1888-1914 :
[Book]
governments versus bankers /
Leonardo Weller.
Cham, Switzerland :
Palgrave Macmillan,
2018.
1 online resource
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Intro; Preface; Acknowledgements; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; Part I Governments versus Bankers; Chapter 1 Introduction; Governments and Banks in the First Financial Globalisation; The Pre-1914 Sovereign Debt Market; Book Outline; Part I-Governments versus Bankers; Parts II-Brazil versus Rothschilds; Part III-Mexico versus Mediocre Banks; References; Chapter 2 Governments versus Bankers in the Pre-1914 Sovereign Debt Market; Theory and History of Sovereign Debt; Rescue Loans and the Government's Side of Sovereign Debt; The Government's Choice: Patron Banking or Competition
Analytical FrameworkConclusion; References; Part II Brazil versus Rothschilds; Chapter 3 Rothschilds' Tropical Empire: Brazil, 1822-1889; Rothschilds Picks a Tropical Empire; Brazil's First Crisis and Rescue Loan; The Return of Rothschilds; Paraguayan War and Debt Boom; The Falling Empire and Its Exposed Bank; Conclusion; References; Chapter 4 Rothschilds' Troubled Republic: Brazil, 1889-1898; Regime Change, Chaos and Stabilisation; The Fiscal Collapse; Rothschilds' Credit Umbrella; Brazil as a Free Rider; The Funding Loan as Shared Policy Ownership; Rothschilds as a Power Broker; Conclusion
ConclusionReferences; Chapter 7 The Bankers' Beloved Dictatorship: Mexico, 1890-1910; The Establishment of a Reputation; Gaining the Upper Hand: The 1899 Loan; Mexico Goes to New York: The 1904 Loan; Porfiriato's Finest Hour: The 1910 Loan; Conclusion; References; Chapter 8 The Loans of the Revolution: Mexico, 1911-1914; The Mexican Revolution; The Fiscal Impact of the Revolution; The 1913 Loan; Paribas, Asymmetry of Information and Conflict of Interest; Speyers and the Nacional Railway; Conclusion; References; Chapter 9 Conclusion; Appendix: Data and Sources; References; Index
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This book analyzes the relative balance of bargaining power between governments and the banks in charge of underwriting their debt during the first financial globalization. Brazil and Mexico, both indebted countries that underwent major changes in reputation and negotiating power as they faced financial crises, provide valuable case studies of government strategies for obtaining the best possible outcomes. Previous literature has focused on bankers' perspectives and emphasized that debtors were submissive during negotiations, but Weller finds that governments' negotiating power varied over time. He presents a new analytical framework that interprets when and why officials were likely to negotiate loans more or less effectively, with newly uncovered primary sources from debtors' and creditors' archives suggesting key causes of variation: fiscal accounts, political stability, and creditors' exposure and reputation.