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عنوان
An epistemic foundation for scientific realism :

پدید آورنده
John Wright.

موضوع
Science-- Methodology.,Mathematical physics.,Philosophy of science.,Quantum & theoretical chemistry.,Science-- Methodology.,SCIENCE-- Philosophy & Social Aspects.

رده
Q175
.
32
.
R42
W75
2018

کتابخانه
کتابخانه مطالعات اسلامی به زبان های اروپایی

محل استقرار
استان: قم ـ شهر: قم

کتابخانه مطالعات اسلامی به زبان های اروپایی

تماس با کتابخانه : 32910706-025

3030022188
9783030022181
303002217X
9783030022174

An epistemic foundation for scientific realism :
[Book]
defending realism without inference to the best explanation /
John Wright.

Cham, Switzerland :
Springer,
[2018]

1 online resource (viii, 220 pages)

Synthese Library ;
volume 402

Includes bibliographical references.

Introduction : realism and reason -- The skeptical arguments against realism I : inductive skepticism -- The skeptical arguments : 2 -- Realism and inference to the best explanation -- On the inference to unobservables -- Underdetermination and theory preference -- Eddington inferences in science -- 1 : atoms and molecules -- Eddington inferences in science -2 : the size and shape of the universe.
0

This monograph develops a new way of justifying the claims made by science about phenomenon not directly observable by humans, such as atoms and black holes. It details a way of making inferences to the existence and properties of unobservable entities and states of affairs that can be given a probabilistic justification. The inferences used to establish realist claims are not a form of, and neither do they rely on, inference to the best explanation. Scientific Realism maintains that scientific theories and hypotheses refer to real entities, forces, and relations, even if one cannot examine them. But, there are those who doubt these claims. The author develops a novel way of defending Scientific Realism against a range of influential attacks. He argues that in some cases, at least, we can make probabilistically justifiable inferences from observed data to claims about unobservable, theoretical entities. He shows how this enables us to place some scientific realist claims on a firmer epistemological footing than has previously been the case. This also makes it possible to give a unified set of replies to the most common objections to Scientific Realism. The final chapters apply the developed conceptual apparatus to key cases from the history of science and from recent science. One example concerns realism with respect to atoms. Another looks at inferences from recent astronomical data to conclusions about the size and shape of those parts of the universe lying beyond that which we can observe.

Springer Nature
com.springer.onix.9783030022181

An Epistemic Foundation for Scientific Realism : Defending Realism Without Inference to the Best Explanation.
9783030022174

Science-- Methodology.
Mathematical physics.
Philosophy of science.
Quantum & theoretical chemistry.
Science-- Methodology.
SCIENCE-- Philosophy & Social Aspects.

PDA
PDA
SCI-- 075000

501
23

Q175
.
32
.
R42
W75
2018

Wright, John, (John N.)

20200823073944.0
pn

 مطالعه متن کتاب 

[Book]

Y

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