Corporate governance of the Saudi Arabian publicly traded companies: An appraisal and proposals for improvement
[Thesis]
Bandar Obeid Alrasheed
Branson, Douglas M.
University of Pittsburgh
2014
408
Committee members: Berkowitz, Daniel; Del Duca, Louis; Oh, Peter B.
Place of publication: United States, Ann Arbor; ISBN=978-1-321-20836-8
S.J.D.
Law
University of Pittsburgh
2014
Changes in economic and business practices around the globe and the rapid reform movement in developing counties require a sound corporate governance structure to be implemented in Saudi Arabia. A winning reform agenda has to take national factors into consideration. Agency problem types (controlling shareholder v. minority shareholders) and a weak external enforcement mechanism (especially judiciary) in the Saudi system suggest that immediate reform of corporate governance should focus on internal corporate governance, namely shareholder position including minority shareholders protection and the board of directors. Such a strategy of reform does not intend to undermine the importance of administrative and judicial reforms to corporate governance efficiency in the country, but rather offers fast-track reform proposals that may boost the corporate governance system until a full development of strong external structure in the country is established. Well-structured internal corporate governance is expected to comply with a number of comparative benchmarks that may reduce agency cost problem and observe the Saudi moral systems, particularly ones related to Islam. Linking corporate governance to the country's moral system will more likely facilitate legal transplant of corporate governance standards into the Saudi system. Overall, the adoption of the proposals recommended in this dissertation is imperative to achieving the goals of improving corporate governance in Saudi Arabia and attracting greater investment in the country's capital market.
Law; Islamic Studies; Middle Eastern Studies
Social sciences;Agency problems;Corporate governance;Directors;Enforcement mechanism;Saudi Arabia;Shareholders