Preface. Acknowledgements. 1: The Systems of Inductive Logic. 1.1. The Main Ideas Preceding the Construction of the Systems of Inductive Logic. 1.2. Carnap's Systems of Inductive Logic. 1.3. The Finnish School's Systems of Inductive Logic. 1.4. The Bayesian Developments of Inductive Logic. 2: Inductive Logic as a Structural Reliabilist Theory of Justification. 2.1. The Mentalist Theory of Justification and Process Reliabilism. 2.2.Conflicting Meta-Level Assumptions of Mentalistic Reliabilist Theories of Justification. 2.3. The Minimalist Theory of Justification and Structural Reliabilism. 2.4. Carnap's Structural Reliabilism. 2.5. The Finnish School's Systems of Inductive Logic and Structural Reliabilism. 3: Structural Reliabilism and the Problems of Bayesian Epistemology. 3.1. Epistemological Criticisms of Carnap's Inductive Logic. 3.2. Structural Reliabilism and Difficulties of Mentalistic Reliabilism. 3.3. Structural Reliabilism and the Paradoxes of Confirmation. 3.4.The Structural Reliabilist Redefinition of the Bayesian Objective-Subjective Dichotomy. Conclusion. References. Index.