Debt as an Option to Own in the Theory of Ownership Rights?- Asymmetric Information and the Horizontal Integration of Firms --; Short-Termism and the Markets for Corporate Control --; The Influence of Transaction Costs in Labor Markets on the Organization of Industry --; A Comparative Analysis of Japanese Industrial Organization --; Information Rent and Technology Choice in a Regulated Firm --; Constitutional Contracting and Corporate Constitution --; Collusion and Budget Distortions in Hierarchical Organizations --; Long-Term Franchise Contracts: A Closer Look at the Hold-Up Problem --; Capital Structure, the Risk Incentive Problem, and Repeated Investment Opportunities --; Financial Contracting with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard --; On the Rationality of Kidnaps, Blackguards, and Hostages --; Information Problems in the Market for Medical Services --; Data Envelopment Analysis: A Basis for Incentive Contracting --; Environmental Problems from a Property Rights Perspective --; Efficient Allocation of an Indivisible Good: A Mechanism Design Problem under Uncertainty --; Risk Sharing Markets and Export Production --; Slot Allocation in the U.S.A Transaction Cost Economic Analysis.
The essays on contract theory offer new results centering around the theory of the firm. Issues of ownership, integration, delegation, and finance are analyzed. Further, topics of medical care, the economics of crime, the environment, and international trade are treated from a contracting perspective. The authors are leading young economists who have worked at the "International Summer School on the New Institutional Economics."