1: Introduction --;1.1. Rational Choice --;1.2. The Theory of Social Choice --;1.3. Restrictions on the Set of Alternatives --;1.4. Structural Stability of the Core --;2: Social Choice --;2.1. Preference Relations --;2.2. Social Preference Functions --;2.3. Arrowian Impossibility Theorems --;2.4. Power and Rationality --;2.5. Choice and Functions --;3: Voting Rules --;3.1. Simple Binary Preference Functions --;3.2. Acyclic Voting Rules on Restricted Sets of Alternatives --;3.3. Manipulation of Choice Functions on Finite Sets of Alternatives --;3.4. Restrictions on the Preferences of Society --;4: The Core --;4.1. Existence of a Choice --;4.2. Existence of a Core in Low Dimensions --;4.3. Convex Preferences --;4.4. Non-Convex Preference --;4.5. The Necessity of the Dimension Constraint --;5: Local Cycles --;5.1. Voting Cycles in Dimension v --;1 --;5.2. Implementation of Choice Functions in Dimension v --;1 --;5.3. Cycles and the Stability Dimension --;5.4. The Stability Dimension v* --;6: Structural Stability --;6.1. Plott Symmetry Conditions --;6.2. Structural Stability of the Optima Set --;6.3. Structural Instability of the Optima Set --;6.4. Stability of the Core and of Cycles --;7: Classification of Voting Rules --;7.1. The Stability and Instability Dimensions --;7.2. Voting Rules in Low Dimensions --;7.3. Majority Rule with an Infinite Electorate --;8: Democratic Theory --;8.1. Liberalism and Populism --;8.2. Populist Democracy and Institutionalism --;8.3. Liberal Theory and Electoral Politics --;8.4. Preferences and Beliefs --;Glossary of Concepts --;Index of Authors --;Index of Terms and Definitions.
SOCIAL CHOICE AND DEMOCRACY, however, is not merely a synthetic exercise, for Schofield's own work over the last decade has constituted a major initiative in deepening and' broadening our general understanding of voting arrangements.