I Introduction to Legal Semiotics --;1 Legal Semiotics: The Peircean Frame --;2 Staking the Claim/Walking the Field --;3 Perspectives on the Legal System --;4 A Comparatist View --;5 Global Developments --;II The Open Hand --;6 The Art of Conversation --;7 Riddles, Legal Decisions, and Peirce's "Existential Graphs" --;8 Speech Acts: Decisions --;9 Pure Play: Rules of Law and Rules of Conduct --;10 Limits of Authority in Law --;III Quid Pro Quo --;11 Contracts and Equivalences --;12 The Mapping of Morals onto Law: Problems of Rights, Ethics, and Values --;13 Economic Justice: The "Takings Clause" and Legal Interpretation --;14 Economic Links with Law: The Market as Sign of a Free Society --;15 Signs of the Naked and the Dressed: Contract and Cause in Law --;IV Interpretation and Value --;16 Origins and Development: Hermeneutics of Law and Politics --;17 American Realism --;18 The Constitution as Interpretant Sign --;19 Property I --;20 Property II --;V Inquiry as Method of Freedom --;21. Inquiry and Discovery Procedures --;22 Conflict of Laws: A Complex Indexical Sign --;23 The Means-End Process of Freedom in Law --;References.
Even if Peirce were well understood and there existed· general agreement among Peirce scholars on what he meant by his semiotics, or philosophy of signs, the undertaking of this book-wliich intends to establish a theoretical foundation for a new approach to understanding the interrelations of law, economics, and politics against referent systems of value-would be a risky venture. But since such general agreement on Peirce's work is lacking, one's sense of adventure in ideas requires further qualification. Indeed, the proverbial nerve for failure must in any case be attendant. If one succeeds, one has introduced for further inquiry the strong possibility that should our social systems of law, economics, and politics--our means of interpersonal transaction as a whole-be understood against the theoretical back ground of a dynamic, "motion-picture" universe that is continually becoming, that is infinitely developing and changing in response to genuinely novel elements that emerge as existents, then the basic concepts of rights, resources, and reality take on new dimensions of meaning in correspondence with n-dimensional, infinite value judgments or truth-like beliefs which one holds. If such a view, as Peirce maintained, were possible and tenable not only for philosophy but as the basis for action and interaction in the world of human experience and practical affairs, one would readily say that risk taking is a small price for the realization of such possibility.