v. 1. The logical foundations of constitutional liberty -- v. 2. Public principles of public debt : a defense and restatement -- v. 3. The calculus of consent : logical foundations of constitutional democracy / James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock -- v. 4. Public finance in democratic process : fiscal institutions and individual choice -- v. 5. The demand and supply of public goods -- v. 6. Cost and choice : an inquiry in economic theory -- v. 7. The limits of liberty : between anarchy and leviathan -- v. 8. Democracy in deficit : the political legacy of Lord Keynes / James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner -- v. 9. The power to tax : analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution / Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan-- v. 10. The reason of rules : constitutional political economy / Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan -- V. 11. Politics by principle, not interest toward nondiscriminatory democracy -- v. 12. Economic inquiry and its logic -- v. 13. Politics as public choice -- v. 14. Debt and taxes -- v. 15. Externalities and public expenditure theory -- v. 16. Choice, contract, and constitutions -- v. 17. Moral science and moral order -- v. 18. Federalism, lilberty, and the law -- v. 19. Ideas, persons, and events -- v. 20. Indexes -- v. 20 Supplement. Corrected indexes to externalities and public expenditure theory