Includes bibliographical references (p. [251]-270) and index
Preface -- Introduction -- 1. Empathy and knowledge of other minds : a historical perspective -- 2. Arguing for empathy systematically -- 3. Brief excursus : empathy, sympathy, and social psychology -- [pt]. 1. Folk psychology and rational agency -- 1.1. Eliminativism and the allure of the detached conception of folk psychology -- 1.2. Humans as rational animals : clearing up a confusion in the rationality debate -- [pt]. 2. Charity and rational contextualism -- 2.1. In defense of global charity -- 2.2. Rational contextualism versus bounded rationality -- [pt]. 3. The theory of mind debate -- 3.1. The theory-theory paradigm -- 3.2. The simulation paradigm -- [pt]. 4. Basic empathy and reenactive empathy -- 4.1. Mindreading, folk-psychological concepts, and mirror neurons -- 4.2. The essential contextuality and indexicality of thoughts as reasons -- [pt]. 5. Folk psychology and normative epistemology -- 5.1. Empathy, folk-psychological predictions, and explanations -- [pt]. 6. The limits of empathy -- 6.1. Objections and misconceptions in the philosophy of social science -- 6.2. Empathy and the prejudicial nature of understanding -- Concluding remarks -- Notes -- References-- Index
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This wide-ranging study argues that empathy is epistemically central for our folk-psychological understanding of other agents. The author counters objections raised by some in the philosophy of social science