v. 1. Normative guidance / Peter Railton -- Saying what we mean : an argument against expressivism / Terence Cuneo -- Expressivism, yes! Relativism, no! / Terry Horgan, Mark Timmons -- Anthropocentric constraints on human value / Justin D'Arms, Mark Timmons -- Anthropocentric constraints on human value / Justin D'Arms, Daniel Jacobson -- The meaning of 'ought' / Ralph Wedgwood -- Knowing enough to disagree : a new response to the moral twin earth argument / Mark van Roojen -- Moral feelings and moral concepts / Allan Gibbard -- Negation for expressivists : a collection of problems with a suggestion for their solution / James Dreier -- Direction of fit and motivational cognitivism / Sergio Tenenbaum -- Misunderstanding metaethics : Korsgaard's rejection of realism / Nadeem J.Z. Hussain, Nishi Shah -- Resisting the buck-passing account of value / Pekka Vayrynen -- Normativity / Derek Parfit
v. 2. Wrongness and reasons : a re-examination / T.M. Scanlon. An outline of an argument for robust metanormative realism / David Enoch. Ecumenical expressivism : the best of both worlds? / Michael Ridge. Cognitivism, expressivism, and agreement in response / Joshua Gert. Moral obligation and accountability / Stephen Darwall. Value and autonomy in Kantian ethics / Robert N. Johnson. Where the laws are / Mark N. Lance and Margaret Olivia Little. Practical reasons and moral 'ought' / Patricia Greenspan. The Humean theory of reasons / Mark Schroeder. Responding to normativity / Stephen Finlay. Normativity / Judith Jarvis Thomson
v. 3. The significance of desire / David O. Brink -- Fitting attitudes and welfare / Chris Heathwood -- The argument from the persistence of moral disagreement / Frank Jackson -- Moral disagreement and moral expertise / Sarah McGrath -- Moral dependence / Nick Zangwill -- Particularism and supervenience / Caj Strandberg -- Robust ethical realism, non-naturalism, and normativity / William J. FitzPatrick -- Constructivism about reasons / Sharon Street -- Rawls and moral psychology / Thomas Baldwin -- Actions, acting, and acting well / Matthew Hanser -- Hume on practical morality and inert reason / Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
v. 4. What to do when you don't know what to do / Andrew Sepielli -- The natural and the normative / Brad Majors -- Doubts about the supervenience of the evaluative / Nicholas L. Sturgeon -- A theory of hedged moral principles / Pekka Vayrynen -- Ethical neo-expressivism / Dorit Bar-On, Matthew Chrisman -- Realist-expressivism and conventional implicature / David Copp -- Guilt-free morality / Gilbert Harman -- Reasons as evidence / Stephen Kearns, Daniel Star -- How to be a cognitivist about practical reason / Jacob Ross -- Archimedeanism and why metaethics matters / Paul Bloomfield -- Constitutivism and the inescapability of agency / Luca Ferrero
v. 5. Reason, reasons and normativity / Joseph Raz -- Value and the right kind of reason / Mark Schroeder -- Normativity, necessity and tense: a recipe for homebaked normativity / Stephen Finlay -- Non-naturalism: the Jackson challenge / Jussi Suikkanen -- How objectivity matters / David Enoch -- When do goals explain the norms that advance them? / James Dreier -- Humean constructivism in moral theory / James Lenman -- Humean theories of motivation / Melissa Barry -- What makes a sentiment moral? / Antti Kauppinen -- Categorizing goods / Julie Tannenbaum -- Truth, beauty and goodness / Simon Blackburn
v. 7. Experiments, intuitions, and methodology in moral and political theory / David Copp -- Laws of Nature, laws of freedom, and the social construction of normativity / Kenneth Walden -- Mental agency and metaethics / Matthew Evans and Nishi Shah -- Elusive reasons / Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge -- Rationality, normativity, and commitment / Jacob Ross -- Open-mindedness and normative contingency / Valerie Tiberius -- Ethical non-naturalism and the metaphysics of supervenience / Tristram McPherson -- Thick concepts: where's evaluation? / Pekka Väyrynen -- Contextualist solution to three puzzles about practical conditionals / J. L. Dowell -- On the meaning of "ought" / Matthew Chrisman -- Bipolar obligation / Stephen Darwall
v. 9. From thought to action / Jonathan Dancy -- Cognitivism about practical rationality / John Brunero -- Vindicating practical norms: metasemantic strategies / Hille Paakkunainen -- Debunking evolutionary debunking / Katia Vavova -- No coincidence? / Matthew Bedke -- Moral skepticism and moral disagreement in Nietzsche / Brian Leiter -- Moral vagueness: a dilemma for non-naturalism / Cristian Constantinescu -- Relax? Don't do it! Why moral realism won't come cheap / Sarah McGrath -- Wrong kinds of reason and the opacity of normative force / Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson
v.8.Relational nature of the good / Christine M. Korsgaard -- Value and reasons to favour / Jonathan Way -- On being social in metaethics / Kate Manne -- Commitments, reasons, and the will / Ruth Chang -- Two dualisms of practical reason / Dale Dorsey -- On the (in)significance of moral disagreement for moral knowledge / Jason Decker and Daniel Groll -- Moral error theory and the belief problem / Jussi Suikkanen -- Truth conditions and the meanings of ethical terms / Alex Silk -- Properties for nothing, facts for free? Expressivism's deflationary gambit / Terence Cuneo -- Believing in expressivism / Teemu Toppinen -- Tempered expressivism / Mark Schroeder