عنوان

Scepticism

9781315694672)electronic bk.(

Scepticism

Routledge

1 online resource )178 page

Routledge Library Editions: Epistemology

Series: Routledge Library Editions: Epist

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Original Title Page -- Original Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- FOREWORD -- I PYRRHO'S SCEPTICISM ACCORDING TO SEXTUS EMPIRICUS -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. SHORT ACCOUNT OF SEXTUS'S PYRRHONISM -- 3. THE SCEPTICAL WAYS OF ANNOUNCEMENT -- 4?iٶ THE DOGMATIC WAYS OF ANNOUNCEMENT -- 5. NEUTRALITY TOWARDS SUBJECTIVIST PHENOMENALISM -- 6. THE SCEPTIC'S REFERENCE TO THE EXISTENCE OF OPPOSITE VIEWS -- 7. THE MATURE SCEPTIC, A MODERATELY KEEN SEEKER AND DOUBTER? -- 8. THE SCEPTIC, A PHILOSOPHER? -- 9?iٶ DEFINING SCEPTICISM -- II THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF SCEPTICISM -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. IS SCEPTICISM MORE LOGICALLY THAN PSYCHOLOGICALLY IMPECCABLE? -- 3. DO THE SCEPTIC'S ACTIONS BETRAY HIS DOGMATISM? -- 4. CAN THE SCEPTIC BELIEVE? -- 5. MUST THE SCEPTIC BE A DOUBTER? -- 6. IS THE SCEPTIC UNPERTURBED BY MODERN SCIENCE? -- 7. IS THE SCEPTIC SENSITIVE TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REAL AND APPARENT? -- 8. GENERAL OUTLOOKS GENERATE SCEPTICISM -- 9. CAN WE ASSUME THAT SEXTUS AND HIS LESS ARTICULATE FRIENDS FULFIL THE REQUIREMENTS? -- III SCEPTICISM AND POSITIVE MENTAL HEALTH -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. CONFRONTATION WITH SIX CRITERIA OF POSITIVE MENTAL HEALTH -- 3, ALLEGED SCEPTICISM OF ST. AUGUSTINE AND OTHERS -- 4?iٶ MODERATE OR FRAGMENTARY SCEPTICISM OF THE UNPHILOSOPHICAL -- 5. ENCOURAGING A SCEPTICAL BENT OF MIND: CAN IT EVER BE RIGHT? -- IV CONCEPTUAL COMPLEMENTARITY OF EVIDENCE AND TRUTH REQUIREMENTS -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. RESTRICTIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS -- 3. SHIFT FROM PLAIN ANNOUNCEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE TO JUSTIFYING CLAIM TO SAY ONE KNOWS -- 4. REQUIREMENTS OF 'KNOWING' INVOLVING THREE QUESTIONS. CORRESPONDING QUESTIONNAIRES -- 5. THE 'THIRD-PERSON' AND 'FIRST-PERSON' QUESTIONNAIRES -- 6. CONCLUSION ON 'REACHING' KNOWLEDGE -- 7. CONCEPTS OF KNOWING WITHOUT A SEPARATELY SATISFIED TRUTH REQU 8. SUGGESTION NOT TO USE KNOWLEDGE EXPRESSIONS UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES -- 9. USE OF 'KNOW' AND DEFINITENESS OF INTENTION -- 10. CONCLUSION ON THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF TRUTH AND EVIDENCE -- V DIALECTICS OF MODERN EPISTEMOLOGICAL SCEPTICISM -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. STANDARDS RELATIVE TO STAGE OF DIALOGUE -- 3. MAXIMUM REQUIREMENTS -- 4. MAXIMUM STRENGTHENING OF REQUIREMENTS IN THE FACE OF MISTAKES -- 5. MAXIMUM AND ABNORMAL REPERCUSSIONS -- 6. 'I KNOW NOTHING'. GENERAL LINGUISTIC COUNTER-ARGUMENT -- 7. CIRCULARITY OF THE SCEPTIC'S ARGUMENT -- 8. THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE. SOCIAL AND LINGUISTIC RIGHTNESS AND TRUTH -- 9. EXAMPLES OF THERE BEING SOMETHING WE KNOW OR CAN KNOW -- 10. EXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE FUSING WITH THE EVIDENCED -- 11. INCORRIGIBILITY AND FALLIBILITY -- 12. CORRIGIBILITY AS A REQUIREMENT OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE -- 13. CAN THE INCORRIGIBILITY REQUIREMENT EVER BE SATISFIED? -- 14. INCORRIGIBILITY OF TRUTH -- 15. CRITICAL INSPECTION OF ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF INCORRIGIBILITY AS UNATTAINABLE -- 16. PENULTIMATE CONCLUSION ON MODERN SCEPTICISM -- 17. ULTIMATE CONCLUSION ON MODERN SCEPTICISM -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -

Scepticism

Naess, Arne.

Title

English Book