Globalization and corporate governance: How capital mobility spurs the adoption of shareholder rights laws, financial disclosure laws, insider trading laws, and laws that curtail employment protection
[Thesis]
;supervisor Shafer, D. Michael
Rutgers The State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick: United States -- New Jersey
: 2007
187 pages
Ph.D.
, Rutgers The State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick: United States -- New Jersey
This dissertation contends that capital mobility causes states to adopt laws to protect shareholder rights, improve financial disclosure, prohibit insider trading, and curtail employment protection. Capital mobility exerts this effect by empowering the most mobile segment of the capital class (a group known as the non-controlling owners of firms) that benefits from the adoption of these laws. Needing to attract capital to fuel economic growth, governments, in turn, modify their laws to regulate corporate governance in a manner that reflects the preferences of the non-controlling owners.To test whether capital mobility has the hypothesized effects on whether states adopt each of these laws, I conduct the appropriate statistical tests to determine whether capital mobility is positively correlated with the adoption of laws that enhance shareholder rights, expand financial disclosure requirements, prohibit insider trading, and reduce employment protection. I also present two case studies, of Italy's adoption of a shareholder rights law in 1998 and Germany's adoption of a law to prohibit insider trading in 1994, that illustrate and substantiate the validity of the causal mechanisms that underlie my theory. The results of all empirical tests are largely consistent with my theoretical expectations.